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Social categories allow children to make inferences about novel situations, which 
can then guide their interactions with others.  However, this process can be complicated 
because individuals often belong to many different, sometimes interrelated, social 
categories.  Four experiments examine whether children and adults differ in their 
willingness to classify a person as holding two social roles (e.g., a mother and a 
daughter), and how this influences their reasoning.  Specifically, this work will examine 
the influence of cross-classification on inductive inferences, trust in testimony, and 
knowledge evaluations.  The aim of these experiments is to investigate whether children 
privilege certain roles when reasoning about individuals who hold multiple social roles.  
Because children rely heavily on their knowledge of individuals’ social roles to interact 
with them appropriately, it is important that children be able to accurately use these social 
categories to reason about others.  Experiments 1 and 2 explore children’s willingness to 
cross-classify individuals into a variety of social roles with varying degrees of 
hierarchical (vs. non-hierarchical) structure.  Experiment 2 further examines what 
cognitive mechanisms may underlie children’s cross-classification behaviors. 
vii 
Experiments 3 and 4 examine how children make inferences about and evaluate the 
testimony of cross-classified individuals.  Overall, the findings of these four experiments 
illustrate that there are developmental differences in willingness to cross-classify and 
reasoning about cross-classified individuals occurring between the preschool, early 
elementary, and adult years.  The results of these experiments suggest that cross-
classification may influence the way children make inferences about individuals, but that 
cross-classification does not influence their trust in the testimony of individuals with 
multiple social roles.  This work contributes to our growing understanding of how 
children utilize information about social categories to reason about others.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Children are constantly receiving novel information from their environment and 
having to make sense of it.  One of the ways that children organize this information is 
through categorization (Markman, 1989).  Categorization refers to the process of 
organizing the environment into cohesive groups of entities, thus allowing these entities 
to be treated equivalently (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, & Boyes-Braem, 1976).  Categories give 
structure to the environment (Murphy, 2002), allow individuals to reason beyond only the 
information that is available (Smith & Medin, 1981), and support inferences about both 
novel situations and individuals (Rhodes, 2013).  Because adults have more general 
knowledge and experience than children, children’s concepts differ from those of adults 
(Carey, 1985).  However, categories are ubiquitous across ages (Murphy, 2002), and 
although children do not display the same broadly defined categories as adults (Rosch, 
1973), they do indeed have fairly complex conceptual abilities (Murphy, 2002).  
Categorical Organization 
Categories can be organized in various ways, at different organizational and 
structural levels.  From a young age, children recognize different kinds of categories.  By 
age three, children are able to make use of script and taxonomic categories (Nguyen & 
Murphy, 2003).  Script categories refer to items that go together in the same sort of event 
or activity (e.g., pumpkins and costumes on Halloween), whereas taxonomic categories 
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include items with shared or common attributes (e.g., birds can fly; Lucariello, Kyratzis, 
& Nelson, 1992).  Children are also able to categorize the same entity into both 
taxonomic and script categories, suggesting that they can use more than one form of 
categorization (e.g., Nguyen & Murphy, 2003).  Knowing what kind of category an item 
belongs to is essential to being able to make accurate judgments about a given category 
and its members (Murphy, 2002).  Categories can also be organized hierarchically at the 
subordinate, basic, and superordinate levels.  Basic level categories are often the first 
categories children develop, share the most common features, and have the highest cue 
validity (i.e., denote the highest likelihood that a cue is associated with a category; Rosch 
& Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976).  Categories can also be organized at the 
superordinate, or broadest level of abstraction, and the subordinate, or most specific level 
of abstraction (Mervis & Crisafi, 1982).  
Blewitt (1994) proposed that children’s understanding of category hierarchies 
progresses through four levels, beginning in the preschool years.  Level one, which 
begins around age two, represents a stage during which children do not have any real 
knowledge of category hierarchies, whereas at level two children have some implicit 
understanding of hierarchies.  In level two, which develops between ages two and four, 
children may accept that an item can belong to multiple categories, although they are 
often unable to reason any further about these multiply classified items.  Upon reaching 
levels three and four, children are able to use their knowledge about the relationship 
between categories to make both quantitative and qualitative inferences.  Indeed, children 
as young as two have been found to form different hierarchical categories and classify the 
same objects within different categories (Blewitt, 1994).  
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Social Categorization 
The study of concepts and categories has historically focused on labeling entities 
and objects, however there is another area of study that has only recently been given as 
much attention.  In recent years, research on how children label and subsequently reason 
about people in different domains and across various social categories has grown.  
Similar to categorizing objects, children use group labels to split up individuals into 
different social categories (Macnamara, 1982).  Indeed, research has suggested that even 
infants are able to pick up on information related to social categorization (Shutts, 
Pemberton, & Spelke, 2013).  In order to interact with and navigate their environments 
successfully, children must be able to determine not only what social group various 
individuals belong to, but also what membership in a social group implies or 
communicates about the characteristics or behaviors of group members.  Relatedly, 
children must recognize that the degree to which group members may be similar or 
dissimilar differs based on the social category in question (Baron, Dunham, Banaji, & 
Carey, 2014).  
Two prominent theories of how children develop and use social categories have 
been proposed.  The first is that social categories are kind referring (Rothbart & Taylor, 
1992), and that the category that an individual fits into reflects some internal aspects of 
that individual which cause its external and observable characteristics and behaviors (e.g., 
a tiger’s DNA causes it look and act like a tiger).  This theory posits that children believe 
social categories denote group membership that is stable over time and predictive of a 
variety of behaviors.  A second, more recent theory is that social categories are markers 
of social obligations (Rhodes, 2013), in that they are used to understand individuals’ 
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interactions and relations to one another.  In support of this theory, studies have found 
that from age three children use social categories to predict social interactions (Rhodes, 
2012).  Given these two theories, much of the research investigating children’s 
development of and reasoning about social categories has focused on exploring whether 
children treat social certain categories as naturally or artificially constructed, and 
investigating how children use categories to determine how they should interact with 
others.  
 One difficulty that children have when categorizing new information is that they 
often see categories as more homogenous (Rhodes & Brickman, 2010) and permanent 
(Diesendruck, Goldfein, Rhodes, Gelman, & Neumark, 2013; Gelman & Wellman, 1991) 
than they may be.  Rhodes and Brickman (2010) found that children often fail to 
recognize that there can be within-category variance, unless the diversity of a sample has 
been emphasized or made salient.  Although adults recognize diverse samples as more 
representative of a category, children often do not, which can prevent them from 
understanding the benefits of making inferences based on diverse rather than 
homogenous samples.  Specific to social categorization, children often face the challenge 
of both recognizing and understanding the different social roles that a person may hold.  
Because the roles people hold are often nonobvious (Gelman & Wellman, 1991) and 
cannot be recognized by simple observation of perceptual properties (Gelman & 
Markman, 1986), social categorization may be difficult for children.  
Work in this area suggests that there are developmental and cultural differences in 
the way children reason about and represent different social categories.  In terms of 
recognizing different social groups, preschoolers can identify various types of people 
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(Kalish & Lawson, 2008), and distinct social categories, including race (e.g., Roberts & 
Gelman, 2016) and gender (e.g., Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  Race and gender represent a 
unique area of study because these categories are often marked by salient physical and 
social markers that other categories may not have.  Rhodes and Gelman (2009) found that 
younger children (5- and 7-year-olds) typically viewed gender as a naturally constructed 
category (i.e., categories of objects that occur in nature).  In contrast, 10-year-old children 
viewed gender as more artificially constructed (i.e., categories of objects that are created 
by humans).  Compared to gender, younger children viewed race as more artificially 
constructed, whereas older children viewed race as naturally constructed.  Further, some 
of the differences in children’s reasoning were attributable to their cultural context (e.g., 
children from rural areas often view race as more naturally constructed than children 
from urban areas; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  Researchers have also investigated how 
people reason about multiracial individuals, or individuals who belong to more than one 
race, and found that both children and adults exhibit more difficulty when performing 
categorization tasks about multiracial versus monoracial individuals (Roberts & Gelman, 
2015).  Both younger and older White children (4- to 13-years-old) were more likely to 
categorize an individual as ‘Black’ when their race was ambiguous (or multiracial).  
Roberts and Gelman (2015) claim that this effect may be a product of overweighing 
minority perceptual features.  Interestingly, this study found no developmental 
differences in perception, indicating that race is a salient enough cue for even young 
children to use when making categorization judgments.  Unlike adults, preschoolers’ 
reasoning about social categories has been suggested to be primarily based on their 
observations of perceptual features (Watson, 1984).  However, in contrast to social 
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categories with distinct visual or physical features, many social categories are defined by 
factors such as occupation, familial role, age, and hobbies.  
Although learning to recognize different social categories is an important aspect 
of social cognitive development, one of the critical functions of social categories is that 
they denote certain expectations for the members of that social group (Kalish & Lawson, 
2008).  For example, the social category of ‘teacher’ allows for certain behavioral (writes 
on a chalkboard), psychological (is smart), and deontic (can tell you what is allowed in 
class) predictions.  These defined group behaviors often exist in relation to another role, 
for example the expected behaviors of a student are defined in reference to the expected 
behaviors of a teacher.  Social groups defined by role-based properties have been shown 
to be particularly salient for children (Kalish & Lawson, 2008).  Kalish and Lawson gave 
children the opportunity to categorize individuals following information about their 
deontic and psychological properties.  They found that both younger and older children 
viewed deontic (or obligation-related) properties as most central to category membership, 
with younger children showing the most reliable judgments of this sort, suggesting that 
children may be less perceptually biased than previously suspected.  By four years old, 
children are also able to use information about an individual’s social category to make 
inferences about shared biological and psychological properties (Shutts et al., 2013).  
Diesendruck and Eldror (2011) have also found that children are able to use biological 
and psychological properties to infer category membership, and that children are more 
concerned with category members sharing the same psychological (rather than biological) 
properties.  Importantly, social categorization also allows children to predict how another 
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person may behave and what that person may be obligated or not allowed to do (Kalish & 
Lawson, 2008).  
Studying social categories is important because people often treat these categories 
as if they are inherent, permanent, and predictive of individuals’ characteristics 
(Diesendruck & Eldror, 2011).   Understanding social categorization is a necessary step 
in knowing how to effectively interact with and behave towards others, as well as a 
foundation of children’s developing social competence (Watson, 1984).  As adults, we 
understand that individuals can simultaneously belong to a multitude of social categories; 
however, the fact that children’s representations are still developing may present an 
obstacle for their understanding that an individual can be a member of various social 
categories at the same time.  
Children’s Cross-classification Behaviors 
While children readily classify new information into existing categories, one 
obstacle they may face is classifying entities into multiple categories.  Cross-
classification is the ability to categorize one item into multiple categories (Murphy & 
Ross, 1999), a necessary skill as almost every individual is a member of multiple social 
categories (Murphy & Ross, 1999; Nguyen & Chevalier, 2015; Ross & Murphy, 1999).  
The ability to cross-classify is not only important to social interactions, but also 
represents children’s developing cognitive flexibility (Nguyen, 2007).  Given that most 
people belong to multiple categories, children need to be able to flexibility shift their 
reasoning to attend to the appropriate role at the appropriate time in order to effectively 
interact with others.  
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Extending work by Ross and Murphy (1999) demonstrating that adults cross-
classify foods into multiple categories, Nguyen and Murphy (2003) examined whether 4-
year-old children, 7-year-old children, and adults would perform cross-classification 
within the food domain when presented with taxonomic and script categories.  
Participants in Nguyen and Murphy’s (2003) third experiment were given the opportunity 
to categorize an item in both a taxonomic and script category on two independent trials.  
While all age groups showed cross-classification levels that were significantly above 
chance, 7-year-old children and adults did so significantly more often than 4-year-old 
children, suggesting that cross-classification abilities improve through the early 
elementary years. 
Nguyen (2007) examined the development of children’s cross-classification 
behaviors within taxonomic and script categories across multiple experiments.  In the 
first experiment, children were given the opportunity to categorize items into both 
taxonomic and script categories on different trials.  Overall, children ages 3-, 4-, and 6-
years-old all cross-classified at levels above chance (i.e., were willing to classify the 
same item as belonging to both a script and a taxonomic category), and this behavior 
increased over these age groups with 6-year-old children showing no significant 
differences from adult-like responding.  In a second study using largely the same 
procedure, 2-year-old children also cross-classified items (although they did this at levels 
only just above chance) and showed no significant differences in responding from the 3-
year-old children in the first experiment.  In a third experiment, participants were asked if 
items could simultaneously belong to both a taxonomic and script category (e.g., “Are 
pajamas bedtime clothes?”).  Participants in all age groups endorsed cross-classified 
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labels at similar rates when these labels were appropriate (e.g., pajamas are bedtime 
clothing, but a library is not a bedtime building).  However, when cross-classified 
category labels were inappropriate, 3-year-old children’s performance was significantly 
worse than the other age groups.  Additionally, 4-year-old children’s performance on the 
inappropriate classification items did not differ from chance.  Taken together, these 
studies indicate that children as young as two are able to able to cross-classify items as 
belonging to both taxonomic and script categories, and by age four children exhibit some 
ability to represent these classifications simultaneously.  Overall, research examining 
children’s cross-classification performance suggests that children have some rudimentary 
ability to reason that objects can simultaneously belong to multiple categories and that in 
certain cases two hierarchically related labels may apply to the same item (Blewitt, 
1994). 
The Present Studies 
Cross-classification is a necessary step in accurately reasoning about the social 
role intersections present when an individual holds more than one role at the same time 
(Watson, 1984).  Despite the fact that performing cross-classification and navigating the 
multiple social roles held by others is an important and ubiquitous experience, relatively 
little research has focused on exploring the emergence and development of young 
children’s cross-classification behaviors in the social domain.  Because children rely 
heavily on their knowledge of social categories to interact with others appropriately, it is 
important that they develop a mature understanding of these categories (Kalish & 
Lawson, 2008; Rhodes & Brickman, 2010).  The current set of experiments will 
contribute to our growing understanding of how children use information about the social 
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roles that individuals hold to make inferences, evaluate testimony, and infer knowledge 
status. 
We are particularly interested in how children reason about individuals in familial 
and occupational roles, given the hierarchical nature of these social roles and the 
literature indicating that children exhibit differences in reasoning in these domains at 
different ages (e.g., Deak & Maratsos, 1998; Jordan, 1980).  These experiments answer 
two questions: 1) How does children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals develop, 
and 2) how does cross-classification influence children’s reasoning in different domains?  
Experiments 1 and 2 will explore children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals into 
a variety of social roles with varying degrees of hierarchical (vs. non-hierarchical) 
structure.  Experiment 2 will further examine whether children’s willingness to cross-
classify individuals in hierarchical social roles can be improved through a brief training 
and whether certain cognitive competencies contribute to children’s cross-classification 
behaviors.  Experiments 3 and 4 will examine how children reason about individuals who 
are cross-classified.  Specifically, we will be examining how cross-classification 
influences children’s inductive inferences, trust in testimony, and knowledge evaluations, 
and whether there are developmental differences in reasoning in these domains from the 
preschool to early elementary years. 
Finally, this work will provide insight into how children’s reasoning about 
individuals may be influenced by cross-classification.  Investigating whether children 
believe others can hold multiple social roles and whether this varies by domain, is 
important to understanding how children may believe they should behave in relation to 
others.  For instance, if a child believes that a woman can be only a mother or a daughter, 
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but not both, this could have implications for how that child thinks they should interact 
with her.  This work will also have implications for how adults explain or talk to children 
about the social roles that other’s hold.  In certain contexts, it may be important to make 
holding multiple social roles salient to children (e.g., being a teacher and a cook may 
indicate a wider knowledge base).  However, in other contexts, it may be beneficial for 
children to be focused on a single social role (e.g., if the role of student undermines the 
role of teacher).  Understanding children’s beliefs about whether individuals can hold 
multiple social roles and how this cross-classification influences children’s reasoning 




EXPERIMENT 1 – CHILDREN’S WILLINGNESS TO CROSS-CLASSIFY 
INDIVIDUALS 
Introduction 
As adults we understand that people often hold many different social roles at the 
same time.  For instance, a woman can simultaneously be a mother, daughter, teacher, 
student, voter, and athlete.  This kind of social categorization is particularly relevant 
because expectations about social roles are important in guiding children’s inferences 
(Kalish & Lawson, 2008) and interactions (Watson, 1984).  For the purpose of the current 
experiment, “social roles” refer to labels that reference identities that provide meaningful 
information about individuals, and that refer to rich social categories.  For example, the 
label “mother” is informative along many dimensions.  Further, understanding the social 
roles that an individual holds provides information about how that person may behave, 
including what that person may be obligated or allowed to do (Kalish & Lawson, 2008; 
Watson, 1984).  Understanding the many social roles held by individuals is important to 
being able to appropriately and effectively interact with others. 
Attributing multiple social roles to a single individual may be a challenging task 
for young children.  In general, children may exhibit a tendency to seek out the one – and 
only – label for an entity.  Classically, Piaget (1928) demonstrated that children typically 
resist the notion that an entity can have multiple labels.  As highlighted in the literature 
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on the mutual exclusivity bias (see Woodward & Markman, 1991, but also see Deak & 
Maratsos, 1998; Mervis, Golinkoff, & Bertrand, 1994), this tendency may be adaptive in 
some situations (e.g., word learning), but it may interfere with children’s ability to 
perform cross-classification.  Further, it has been suggested that even older children and 
adults will default to a mutual exclusivity type bias when integrating new and old names 
for a given referent (Merriman & Bowman, 1989).  Although some studies have indicated 
that children as young as two years old are willing to generate more than one term to 
refer to a single entity (Clark & Svaib, 1997), it is unclear if they will do so when the 
terms in question are social roles. 
Dahlgren (1985) suggested that individual social categories are represented in a 
similar manner to other entities (e.g., animals, food, etc.).  However, it is unclear whether 
children treat social categories as if they are exclusive (e.g., a student cannot also be a 
teacher) or inclusive (e.g., a mother can also be a daughter).  Thus, the current experiment 
aims to answer two questions: a) does children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals 
change over the course of development, and b) does the structure of the social roles being 
probed influence children’s cross-classification behaviors? In order to explore these 
questions in a systematic manner, we elected to probe children’s intuitions about cross-
classification by presenting them with pairs of social roles that were more or less 
structured and asking children to determine whether an individual could hold both roles. 
In the current experiment we generally investigated children’s willingness to 
attribute two social roles to a single individual.  If children apply the same governing 
principles that they apply to basic level labels to social roles, then they may treat them as 
mutually exclusive.  Alternatively, children may learn to suspend the mutual exclusivity 
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bias over the course of development.  Critically, some social roles are more related, or 
structured, than others.  Thus, it is possible that children may treat some social roles as 
more exclusive than others.  
In order to manipulate structure, we presented children with social roles that 
varied on that dimension.  Our highly structured stimuli included two kinds of social 
roles with hierarchical structure, including familial (e.g., mother-daughter), and 
occupational (e.g., teacher-student) dominant-subordinate pairs of social roles.  These 
hierarchically structured roles were contrasted with non-hierarchical occupations (e.g., 
cook-runner).  Thus, contrast allowed us to determine whether children treat social roles 
as exclusive because they are basic level labels, or if children treat them in this manner 
because they are meaningfully structured.  One weakness of this design is that children 
may reasonably infer that all of these social role labels are non-exclusive and doing so 
may set up a response pattern wherein children simply affirm every item.  In order to 
prevent such a task demand from unduly influencing participants’ responses, we also 
presented children with other labels that were not social roles, including items involving 
relative social (e.g., nice-mean) and biological (e.g., tall-short) evaluations.  If children 
do tend to cross-classify, then these items will help us to understand whether the nature of 
the judgment (social versus biological) or the contrast between the labels (relative in this 
case, rather than absolute) influences children’s willingness to cross-classify.  Finally, in 
order to ensure that the children were paying attention to the task, we included check 
items that children should have been unwilling to cross-classify, as they included basic 
level labels that they should have treated as exclusive (e.g., person-giraffe).  This array of 
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dimensions allowed us to determine when children were willing to attribute multiple roles 
to the same individual, and to identify what variables were relevant to their intuitions.  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants in this experiment included a group of younger children, older 
children, and adults, recruited from urban and suburban areas in and around Louisville, 
KY.  These age groups were selected to represent different levels of cognitive 
development and formal schooling experience (Carey, 1985; Gelman, 1988).  Thirty-
three 3- to 5-year-old children (Mage = 4.80, SD = .813, females = 16), 30 6- to 8-year-old 
children (Mage = 7.65, SD = .920, females = 13), and 35 adults participated in this 
experiment.  None of the children who participated in Experiment 1 participated in any of 
the subsequent experiments.  Adults were included in this experiment to represent 
“mature” reasoning about these concepts.  Note that, as a requirement of the IRB 
approval of this experiment, adult demographic information was not collected.  Eighty-
four percent of the children in this experiment were Caucasian, 3% were Asian, 2% were 
African American, and 2% were mixed race (parents of the remaining 9% did not provide 
a response).  An additional 20 3- to 5-year-olds were interviewed, but their data were 
excluded from analyses for failing to respond correctly to two or more of the check items.  
Of the participants that were excluded, 35% were age three (N = 7), 30% were age four 
(N = 6), and 35% were age five (N = 7).  All participants included in data analyses passed 
two or more of the check items.  We had no initial estimates of effect size to use in 
estimating appropriate sample sizes for this experiment.  Thus, we elected to recruit 
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moderately large samples for each age group.  Post-hoc power analyses revealed that our 
method was sufficiently powerful to detect significant effects with a sample size of only 
18 participants per group.  Thus, we concluded that the above sample sizes were 
appropriate.   
Materials  
The materials for this experiment included 24 images of adults (half female and 
half male) with neutral facial expressions from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, 
& Wittenbrink, 2015).  The images included faces of Asian, Caucasian, African-
American, and ambiguous origin.  Participants were shown an image of a face on a 
laptop, using presentation software.  Images were accompanied by a statement and 
follow-up question.   
This cross-classification query included 24 questions made up of 12 different 
pairs of social roles (see Table 1 and Appendix A).  Pairs of social roles were divided into 
six different categories, two with hierarchical structure (e.g., familial hierarchical, 
occupation hierarchical), one with no hierarchical structure (e.g., occupation non-
hierarchical), two relative pairs (e.g., social relative, biological relative), and one set of 









Pairs of social roles presented (Experiment 1) 
Category Pairs 
Familial Hierarchical Mom – Daughter; Dad – Son 
Occupation Hierarchical Teacher – Student; Doctor – Patient 
Occupation Non-hierarchical Cook – Runner; Artist – Swimmer 
Social Relative Rich – Poor; Mean – Nice 
Biological Relative Tall – Short; Weak – Strong 
Check Person – Dolphin; Person – Giraffe 
Adult judgments. To ensure that the pairs of social roles we presented had the 
structure we intended, we collected preliminary data from an additional 20 adult 
participants to examine how ‘associated’ they believed the roles in question to be.  In 
addition to the pairs of social roles presented in Table 1, we included four check items 
probing unrelated social roles (e.g., daughter-cook).  These pairs of social roles were 
randomly selected across the social categories. 
Participants judged how associated they believed two social roles to be on a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all associated) to 7 (extremely associated).  We 
utilized one-sample t-tests to compare mean scores of each item category to the midpoint 
(midpoint = 3.5; see Figure 1).  We found that within the familial hierarchical, occupation 
hierarchical, biological relative, and social relative item categories, associative judgments 
were all significantly above chance, p’s < .001.  In contrast, the associative judgments of 
the occupation non-hierarchical, check items (animal), and unrelated check items (social 
roles) were all significantly below chance, p’s < .001.  Thus, we concluded that the pairs 




Figure 1. Mean associative ratings by Item Category.
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Procedure 
The experimenter and the child sat side-by side with a laptop between them.  For 
each test item, the experimenter gave the participant a brief description followed by a 
question about the specific image presented on the screen.  For example, “This person is 
a daughter.  Can this person also be a mom?” The participants then answered with either 
“yes” or “no.”  Items were presented in one of two pseudo-random orders, in that no item 
category had a run of more than two pairs.  Each pair of social roles was presented twice 
so that each role appeared first (e.g., “This person is a teacher.  Can this person also be a 
student?” and “This person is a student.  Can this person also be a teacher?”).  
Participants were either tested in a quiet space at their school or in a university research 
lab.  Each testing session lasted approximately ten minutes.  
Results 
For each trial, participants were scored a 1 for responding that an individual could 
hold both social roles and a 0 for saying they could not, resulting in a total composite 
score that could range from 0-4 for each of the five item categories (check items were 
used as an inclusion criterion, but were not analyzed).  
Preliminary analyses revealed no main effects of order or gender at any age, 
therefore we collapsed subsequent analyses across these factors.  We used a repeated 
measures ANOVA with Age Group (younger children, older children, and adults) as a 
between-subjects factor and Item Category (familial hierarchical, occupation hierarchical, 
occupation non-hierarchical, social relative, and biological relative) as a within-subjects 
factor.  Because the assumption of sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser estimates 
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are reported where appropriate.  Our analysis revealed a significant main effect of Age 
Group, F(2, 95) = 16.69, p < .001, p2 = .26, and a significant main effect of Item 
Category, F(3.30, 313.20) = 18.05, p < .001, p2 =.16, embedded within a significant 
interaction between Age Group and Item Category, F(6.59, 313.20) = 7.31, p < .001, p2
=.13.  
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests revealed that younger children showed no 
differences in responding between any of the item categories.  In contrast, older children 
cross-classified occupation non-hierarchical items significantly more often than familial 
hierarchical, occupation hierarchical, and biological relative items, ps < .001.  Adults 
cross-classified occupation non-hierarchical items significantly more often than social 
relative items, p < .05, and they cross-classified biological relative items at a significantly 
lower rate than all four of the other item categories, ps < .05. 
Within the familial hierarchical category, both younger children (M = 2.21, SD = 
1.69) and older children (M = 2.87, SD = 1.48) had significantly lower scores than adults 
(M = 3.97, SD = .17), p < .01 (see Figure 2).  Within the occupation hierarchical 
category, younger children (M = 1.97, SD = 1.78) had significantly lower scores than 
both older children (M = 2.93, SD = 1.17) and adults (M = 3.89, SD = .40), p < .01, and 
older children also had significantly lower scores than adults, p < .01.  Within the 
occupation non-hierarchical, category younger children (M = 2.36, SD = 1.85) had 
significantly lower scores than both older children (M = 3.83, SD = .59) and adults (M = 
4.00, SD = .00), p < .01.  Within the social relative category, younger children (M = 1.88, 
SD = 1.60) had significantly lower scores than both older children (M = 3.33, SD = 1.09)
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and adults (M = 3.40, SD = .85), p < .001.  Within the biological relative category, there 
were no differences between younger children (M = 2.18, SD = 1.74), older children (M = 




Figure 2.  Mean number of cross-classifications for each Item Category by Age Group. 
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Discussion 
The goal of this experiment was to examine developmental differences in 
willingness to cross-classify individuals into multiple social roles, and whether this 
willingness was influenced by the structure of the category in question.  This experiment 
was intended to gather a baseline for children’s cross-classification behaviors as they 
pertained to the social roles that an individual may hold.  Although previous research has 
suggested that children are more willing to cross-classify items over the course of 
development (Nguyen, 2007), they may struggle more broadly with allowing one entity 
to have multiple labels (Woodward & Markman, 1991), especially at the same basic 
level.  Although studies have investigated both children’s cross-classification behaviors 
(e.g., Nguyen, 2007; 2012; Nguyen & Chevalier, 2015; Nguyen & Murphy, 2003) and 
their social categorization in general (e.g., Diesendruck & Eldror, 2011; Kalish & 
Lawson, 2008; Rhodes, 2013), none have directly investigated children’s willingness to 
cross-classify individuals into more than one social role across various social categories.  
Thus, we believe this to be one of the first studies to specifically investigate children’s 
willingness to cross-classify individuals into multiple social roles at the basic level, and 
to examine how their willingness to cross-classify individuals varies given the structure 
of the social roles in question (e.g., hierarchical vs. non-hierarchical). 
The first aim of this experiment was to determine whether willingness to 
cross-classify individuals changes over the course of development.  The results revealed 
that overall younger children cross-classified individuals significantly less often than 
older children and adults in the majority of the categories being probed (with the 
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exception of the biological relative category).  The older participants in this experiment 
represented a midpoint between the younger children and adults in that they showed adult-like 
reasoning in some domains (e.g., occupation non-hierarchical, social relative, biological 
relative), but not others (e.g., familial hierarchical, occupation hierarchical), suggesting that 
children become more willing to cross-classify individuals into multiple social roles over the 
course of development. 
The second aim of this experiment was to determine whether the structure of the 
social role in question influences cross-classification behaviors.  Younger children cross-
classified at similarly random rates across all of the item categories, suggesting that they 
may be treating these roles as mutually exclusive, regardless of their structure.  Older 
children were willing to attribute two roles to a single person when the roles in question 
were unstructured, but when the roles were structured hierarchically, older children were 
less willing to attribute both to the same person.  Because older children were willing to 
cross-classify non-hierarchical social roles, they appear to be using the structure of the 
roles, rather than mutual exclusivity alone, to determine whether an individual may hold 
both roles simultaneously.  This interpretation is supported by children’s responses to the 
social relative items as well.  These judgments were less straightforward, as indicated by 
adult performance being below ceiling, but the reported pattern of results suggests that 
young children treated social relative labels as being more exclusive (i.e., you can’t be 
rich and poor at the same time) than older children and adults, who treated them as less 
exclusive, perhaps alluding to a better understanding of the relative nature of judgments 
of variables such as wealth.  Finally, we hesitate to further interpret responses to the 
biological relative judgments.  We intended them to represent an opportunity for our 
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participants to generate “no” responses other than on check items, but adults and children 
were more mixed in their responses than we anticipated. 
There are a few possible explanations for children’s reluctance to cross-classify 
individuals into multiple social roles.  The first, and most straightforward explanation is 
that children broadly have difficulty with cross-classification; however, this does not 
completely explain the reluctance that children exhibited in the current experiment.  
Given that older children showed adult-like cross-classification in some categories but 
not in others, specifically those with hierarchical structure, it is possible that these 
differences may reflect the development of cognitive processes, such as executive 
function or cognitive flexibility.  There may also be more domain-specific differences 
that account for some of the results seen in the current experiment.  For example, children 
may have difficulties understanding the present-future continuity of some of these roles 
(Jordan, 1980).  Although previous studies have investigated present-future continuity in 
terms of kinship roles specifically, the occupation hierarchical roles in the current 
experiment have a similar structure in that these roles may represent a present-future 
transformation (e.g., student-teacher), but can also be held simultaneously.  Our findings 
suggest that although younger children exhibit the lowest levels of cross-classification 
behaviors in general, children are still developing the ability to cross-classify individuals 
into roles with hierarchical structure through the early school years. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although the current experiment establishes a baseline for children’s cross-
classification behaviors in terms of social roles, it is unclear what underlies the 
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developmental differences that were observed.  It is possible that there are developmental 
differences in general cognitive abilities (e.g., cognitive flexibility, non-verbal reasoning, 
executive functioning) that could account for some of the differences in children’s cross-
classification behaviors.  Future studies should include measures of cognitive abilities as 
a possible mechanism for explaining developmental differences in reasoning about the 
cross-classification of individuals. 
In future work, it will also be important to investigate how children use the 
information about a given individual’s social roles to reason within other domains.  One 
area of interest is how children make inferences about cross-classified individuals.  
Previous research has indicated that when making inductive inferences, children may rely 
more on social categories than other available information (Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; 
Heyman & Gelman, 1998; Nguyen, 2012).  However, based on children’s reluctance to 
cross-classify individuals into hierarchical roles in the current experiment, it could be the 
case that when making inferences about cross-classified individuals, children defer to one 
role instead of accounting for all of an individual’s social roles.  Exploring how social 
roles contribute to children’s reasoning about others’ testimony is another area of 
considerable importance.  Children’s lack of direct access to information (Harris, 2012) 
results in much of their knowledge being acquired through information received from 
others (Csibra & Gergely, 2009).  Research has suggested that individuals may rely on 
group membership to make inferences about informants by extending information about a 
social category to all of its members (Landrum, Eaves, & Shafto, 2015).  In future work, 
it will be crucial to determine how children’s reasoning about cross-classified individuals 
influences their reasoning in other domains of social cognition. 
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Conclusions 
Understanding how children reason about the social roles that others hold is 
an important step in more broadly understanding children’s social cognitive 
development (Watson, 1984).  When children do not, or cannot, account for the 
multiple social roles that individuals hold, this can limit their interactions to be in 
relation to one selected social role rather than a given individual’s full identity.  It is 
also important that we, as adults, understand where children may be lacking in their 
overall understanding of social categorization.  
Based on these preliminary findings, the subsequent studies reported here will 
focus on social roles that have a hierarchical structure, specifically familial and 
occupational roles.  Focusing on these social roles will allow us to determine how these 
difficulties in cross-classification impact children’s reasoning about individuals in 
various domains, and specifically how children make inferences, evaluate testimony, and 
make judgments about expertise.
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT 2 – TEACHING CHILDREN TO CROSS-CLASSIFY INDIVIDUALS 
Introduction 
In Experiment 1, young children exhibited a general reluctance to classify 
individuals as simultaneously holding two social roles, and older children showed this 
same pattern of responding for social roles that had a hierarchical structure.  However, it 
is unknown why children exhibited this reluctance to cross-classify individuals.  Given 
that previous research has demonstrated that young children are able to cross-classify 
entities outside of a social role domain (Nguyen, 2007; Nguyen & Murphy, 2003), it 
seems unlikely that children’s reluctance in Experiment 1 came from a broader difficulty 
with cross-classification tasks.  Similarly, the breadth of work indicating that children 
will accept multiple labels for a referent at young ages (Clark & Svaib, 1997; Deak & 
Maratsos, 1998; Waxman & Hatch, 1992), suggests that it is unlikely that children’s 
reluctance was due primarily to a mutual exclusivity bias.  Thus, it is possible that there is 
a more general cognitive limitation, such as cognitive load, contributing to children’s 
reluctance to classify individuals as simultaneously holding multiple social roles.  
Cognitive load theory suggests that learning and performance are hindered when 
processing demands are too high (Mayer & Moreno, 2003).  According to cognitive load 
theory, when children are learning or dealing with new information, their working 
memory capacity is limited and their performance often degrades (Paas, Renkl, & 
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Sweller, 2004).  Various strategies have been proposed to improve performance by 
decreasing cognitive load, including receiving training prior to learning (Mayer & 
Moreno, 2003) and practicing new skills (Paas et al., 2004).  In Experiment 1, it could 
have been the case that children did not have the processing capabilities to 
simultaneously hold multiple representations for the same individual (Flavell et al., 
1986).  Mayer and Moreno (2003) suggest that when there are limitations on cognitive 
load caused by representational complexity, presenting some sort of animation paired 
with narration can reduce the need to hold multiple representations in memory.  
Similarly, scaffolding, or assisting a child with elements of a task that exceed their 
learning capacity can improve their performance on tasks that may otherwise be too 
difficult for them (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976).  
Thus, in Experiment 2, we investigated whether reducing children’s cognitive 
load would lead to an increased willingness to cross-classify individuals.  In order to 
lighten children’s cognitive load, we presented them with scaffolding in the form of a 
short narrative explaining the hierarchical family structure accompanied by a ‘family 
tree’ schematic.  If children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals is influenced by 
their cognitive load, then this intervention should increase children’s rates of cross-
classification.  If the intervention does lead to any increase in children’s rates of cross-
classification, this could indicate that the willingness to perform cross-classification is not 
limited by children’s cognitive competencies, but perhaps by the maturity of their 
conceptual representations.  It could also be the case that children tested in Experiment 1 
were more reluctant to cross-classify individuals, because they were not familiar with the 
occupational hierarchical social roles we probed.  To explore this explanation, we 
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included a matching task in Experiment 2, designed to ensure that children were familiar 
with the social roles we presented. 
In addition to examining whether cross-classification behaviors can be increased 
by reducing cognitive load, we also explored two cognitive competencies as possible 
explanations for any developmental differences we may find in Experiment 2.  Based on 
the systematic differences that emerged in children’s cross-classification behaviors in 
Experiment 1, it is possible that there were improvements in specific cognitive 
competencies that may have predicted these differences in responding.  One possibility is 
that developmental differences in cognitive flexibility predict children’s cross-
classification behaviors.  Cognitive flexibility, or the ability to categorize the same item 
differently based on specific contexts (Ionescu, 2012), develops over the course of 
childhood.  It may be that children’s willingness to classify an individual as 
simultaneously holding multiple social roles depends on their ability to flexibly switch 
their cognitive representation of that individual (e.g., from daughter to mom).  It could 
also be that general relational or non-verbal reasoning explains some of the variance in 
children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals.  Relational reasoning, or the ability to 
find meaningful relationships between entities (Jablansky, Alexander, Dumas, & 
Compton, 2015), develops throughout childhood and is fundamental to later abstract 
thought (Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996; Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006).  Although 
young children have some ability to perform relational reasoning, this skill improves over 
the early and later elementary school years (Jablansky et al., 2015).  Given that there are 
improvements in cognitive flexibility and nonverbal reasoning that occur in early 
childhood, we included measures of these two cognitive competencies to examine 
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whether or not they predict children’s cross-classification behaviors. In the current 
experiment, children will be presented with the same cross-classification task that was 
used in Experiment 1, however this task will be preceded by a training task designed to 
provide children with scaffolding for performing cross-classification.  The central task of 
Experiment 2 differs from Experiment 1 in that only familial hierarchical, occupation 
hierarchical, and occupation non-hierarchical items were presented.  Following the cross-
classification task, children completed the Dimensional Change Card Sort - border 
version (DCCS; Zelazo, 2006) as a measure of cognitive flexibility and the KBIT-2 Non-
verbal Reasoning Subscale (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004).   
Methods 
Participants 
Based on an a priori power analysis using effect sizes from Experiment 1, we 
determined that a sample size of 18 children per age group would be sufficient to detect 
significant effects.  Age groups in this experiment and all subsequent experiments will be 
narrower than those in Experiment 1 for a few reasons.  First, the large number of three-
year-old children that failed to pass the check questions in Experiment 1, led us to believe 
that tasks of this nature may be too difficult for this age group.  Second, there seemed to 
be a shift between preschool and school-aged children in the understanding of kinship 
terms (Watson, 1984), for this reason we did not be include six-year-old children, as they 
may represent a transition in kinship understanding.  Thus, participants in this experiment 
included a group of younger children and older children, recruited from urban and 
suburban areas in and around Louisville, KY.  Eighteen 4- to 5-year-old children (Mage = 
5.02, SD = .66, females = 9) and 17 7- to 8-year-old children (Mage = 7.91, SD = .59, 
32 
females = 9) participated in this experiment.  None of the children who participated in 
Experiment 2 participated in any of the subsequent experiments.  Seventy-four percent of 
the children in this experiment were Caucasian, 9% were African American, 3% were 
Asian, and 11% were mixed race (parents of the remaining 3% did not provide a 
response).  An additional 2 children were interviewed, but their data were excluded from 
analyses due to experimenter error in the administration of the KBIT-2.  
Materials 
The training materials for this experiment included a ‘family tree’ schematic.  The 
family tree was presented on plain white 8.5 x 11 in. paper in black and white ink and 
depicted 3 generations of family members (see Figure 3).  The ‘family tree’ schematic 
was gender matched so that male participants saw and heard about a family tree including 
three generations of males, and female participants saw and heard about three generations 
of females. 
33 
Figure 3. Example of ‘family tree’ schematic shown to participants in Experiment 2. 
Family members were shown as line drawings to control for any perceptual features that 
children may have been relying on to make their judgments.  The cross-classification 
items were identical to those used in Experiment 1 and were similarly presented.  The 
cross-classification items for this experiment included 6 different pairs of social roles (see 
Table 2) divided into three different categories: two with hierarchical structure (e.g., 
family hierarchical, occupation hierarchical) and one without such structure (e.g., 
occupation non-hierarchical). 
Table 2 
Pairs of social roles presented (Experiment 2) 
Category Pairs 
Familial Hierarchical Mom – Daughter; Dad – Son 
Occupation Hierarchical Teacher – Student; Doctor – Patient 
Occupation Non-hierarchical Cook – Runner; Artist – Swimmer 
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Participants also completed a matching task where they were instructed to identify 
4 images of different social roles (teacher, student, doctor, patient) from an array of 5 
photos.  For each item, participants were asked to point to a certain social role (ex: “Can 
you point to the teacher;” see Figure 5 for example of stimuli).  A fifth social role (chef) 
was included as a lure to ensure that children’s correct identifications were not simply a 
product of eliminating all other response options.  After the matching task, cognitive 
flexibility was measured using the Dimensional Change Card Sort – border version (Frye, 
Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Zelazo, 2006).  Non-verbal reasoning abilities were measured 
using the KBIT-2 Non-verbal reasoning subsection (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004).  See 
Appendix B for example protocol (excluding KBIT-2 section). 
Procedure 
To begin the experiment, the experimenter introduced the child to the family tree.  
The experimenter started at the bottom of the family tree and gave the following 
instructions: “First, I want to tell you about this picture.  This person is her/his 
daughter/son.  This person is her/his mom/dad.  She/he is also this person’s daughter/son.  
This person is her/his mom/dad.”  As the narrative progressed, the experimenter indicated 
the individuals they were referencing, so that children were able to keep track of which 
referent the experimenter was talking about.  After this training, participants completed 
the cross-classification task as in Experiment 1.  Following the cross-classification task, 
participants completed a matching task in which they were instructed to identify images 
of four different social roles (e.g., “Can you point to the picture of a teacher?”).  
Participants then completed the DCCS – border version, followed by the KBIT-2 Non-





To ensure that children were familiar with the social roles that we presented, we 
included a matching task where participants were instructed to identify the four 
occupation hierarchical social roles included in this experiment.  For the matching task, 
participants were scored a 1 for responses that correctly matched a given social role label 
with the appropriate image, and a 0 for incorrect responses. 
We used one-sample t-tests to compare participants responding on each matching 
task item to chance (chance = 20%).  Younger children correctly identified the student (M 
= .83, SD = .38), teacher (M = .89, SD = .23), patient (M = .56, SD = .51), and doctor (M 
= .89, SD = .32) at levels significantly above chance, p’s < .01.  Older children correctly 
identified the all social roles on 100% of the trials, so t-tests were not calculated.   
Social Role Cross-Classification Data 
For each cross-classification trial, participants were scored a 1 for responding that 
an individual could hold both social roles and a 0 for saying they could not, resulting in a 
total composite cross-classification score that could range from 0-4 for each of the three 
item categories.  Preliminary analyses revealed no main effects of order or gender, 
therefore we did not include these factors in subsequent analyses.  We used a repeated 
measures ANOVA with Age Group (younger children and older children) as a between-
subjects factor and Item Category (familial hierarchical, occupation hierarchical, and 
occupation non-hierarchical) as a within-subjects factor.  Our analysis revealed no 
significant main effect of Age Group, F(1, 33) = .02, p = .888, p2 = .001, or Item 
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Category, F(2, 66) = 1.75, p = .182, p2 =.05.  However, there was a significant 
interaction between Age Group and Item Category, F(2, 66) = 5.02, p < .05, p2 =.13.  
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed that younger children showed no 
differences in responses between the occupation hierarchical items (M = 3.17, SD = 
1.38), occupation non-hierarchical items (M = 2.94, SD = 1.39), and familial hierarchical 
items (M = 3.00, SD = 1.60; see Figure 4).  In contrast, older children cross-classified 
occupation non-hierarchical items (M = 3.29, SD = 1.36) and familial hierarchical items 
(M = 3.18, SD = 1.13) significantly more often than occupation hierarchical items (M = 
2.47, SD = .94), p’s < .05. 
  We also conducted one-sample t-tests to compare children’s scores in each item 
category to chance (chance = 2).  Younger children’s scores were significantly greater 
than chance on the occupation hierarchical, t(17) = 3.58, p < .01, occupation non-
hierarchical, t(17) = 2.88, p < .01, and familial hierarchical items, t(17) = 2.64, p < .05.  
Older children’s scores were also significantly greater than chance on the occupation 
hierarchical, t(16) = 2.06, p = .05, occupation non-hierarchical, t(16) = 3.93, p = .001, and 




Figure 4.  Mean number of cross-classifications for each Item Category by Age Group. 
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Relationship between Cognitive Competencies and Social Role Cross-Classification 
There was a positive correlation between children’s age and their DCCS score, r = 
.52, p < .01, as should be expected given children’s increasing cognitive flexibility over 
the preschool and early elementary years (see Table 3).  Using multiple regression, we 
tested a model that assumed all three of our variables of interest – age (in years), 
cognitive flexibility (DCCS), and non-verbal reasoning (KBIT-2) – predict children’s 
overall performance on cross-classification trials.  Note that the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) and Tolerance values for this model indicated that multicollinearity was not a 
problem for interpreting these data.  This “full” model did not produce a significant 
regression equation, R2 = .03, F(3, 31) = .30, p = .83 (see Table 4).  Further, none of our 
variables of interest contributed significantly to the model.  Note that a larger sample size 
may have increased our ability to detect significant relationships between variables. 
However, the reported model does not approach significance and a feature of our 
manipulation is that it reduced variability.  Thus, we concluded that these factors did not 








Comparison of Results across Experiments 1 and 2 
To more directly examine the effects that the scaffolding in Experiment 2 had on 
children’s cross-classification behaviors, we compared children’s scores on the cross-
classification task across Experiments 1 and 2.  We used a repeated measures ANOVA 
with Age Group (younger children and older children) and Experiment (Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2) as between-subjects factors and Item Category (familial hierarchical, 
occupation hierarchical, and occupation non-hierarchical) as a within-subjects factor.  
Because the assumption of sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser estimates are 
reported where appropriate.  Our analysis revealed no significant main effect of 
Experiment, F(1, 94) = 1.29, p = .26, a marginally significant main effect of Age Group, 
F(1, 94) = 3.12, p = .08, p2 = .05, and a significant main effect of Item Category, 
F(1.832, 172.230) = 8.90, p < .001, p2 = .09.  Significant interactions between Age 
Group and Item Category, F(1.832, 172.230) = 6.00, p < .01, p2 =.06, and Age Group 
and Experiment, F(1, 94) = 3.89, p = .05, p2 = .04, were also detected, all embedded 
within a significant three-way interaction between Item Category, Age Group, and 




Figure 5.  Mean number of cross-classifications for each Item Category by Age Group and Experiment. 
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 Bonferroni-corrected planned comparisons comparing each age group’s 
performance between experiments revealed that there were no significant differences in 
older children’s responding across item categories in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  
However, younger children had significantly higher scores on the occupation hierarchical 
items in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, p < .01, d = .75. Younger children’s scores 
on the familial hierarchical items were also trending towards being significantly higher in 
Experiment 2 than Experiment 1, p = .08, d = .61.  Younger children’s scores on the 
occupation non-hierarchical items did not differ between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
Discussion 
Social role cross-classification.  The first goal of this experiment was to 
determine whether a training session aimed at reducing cognitive load by highlighting 
hierarchical family structure would influence children’s willingness to cross-classify 
individuals in social roles with such structure.  Overall, there were no significant 
differences in younger and older children’s willingness to classify individuals as holding 
multiple social roles.  However, for the older children in this experiment, there were 
differences in responding based on the structure of the social role in question.  Older 
children cross-classified occupation non-hierarchical and familial hierarchical items 
significantly more often than occupation hierarchical items.  When participants were 
provided with this scaffolding, there were no longer differences between age groups (as 
seen in Experiment 1) and responding in both age groups was above chance for all items.   
Taken together, the results of the cross-classification task in this experiment 
suggest that the scaffolding that the family tree schematic and training provided may 
have reduced the cognitive load on children, thus increasing their cross-classifications in 
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the familial hierarchical category.  Although the younger children seemed to show 
domain general increases in cross-classification behaviors (i.e., their cross-classifications 
did not differ across item types), the training seemed to provide only domain specific 
improvements for the older children.  For the older children, scaffolding increased cross-
classification rates for the familial hierarchical items to be similar to the rates for the 
occupational non-hierarchical items.  However, this was not the case for the occupation 
hierarchical items, indicating that this training did not extend to hierarchical relationships 
in general. 
Relationship between cognitive competencies and social role cross-
classification.  The second aim of this experiment was to examine the relationship 
between children’s cognitive competencies and their cross-classification behaviors in a 
social domain.  The results indicate that neither cognitive flexibility nor non-verbal 
reasoning predicted children’s cross-classification behaviors in a social domain.  
Although the results also suggest that age, cognitive flexibility, and non-verbal reasoning 
did not predict cross-classification behaviors, we believe these results should be 
interpreted cautiously.  Because we attempted to scaffold children in this experiment to 
perform cross-classifications at higher rates, it could be the case that our manipulation 
removed some of the individual differences in cross-classification behaviors between age 
groups.  The results of the current study suggest that holding multiple representations in 
their heads may decrease children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals. 
Cross-experiment comparison.  To more directly examine the effect that the 
scaffolding in Experiment 2 had on children’s cross-classification behaviors, we 
compared cross-classification data between Experiments 1 and 2.  Note that this 
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comparison is somewhat imperfect due to the differences between the two experiments; 
however, for exploratory purposes we believe this analysis to be particularly valuable.  
Our results indicated that older children’s scores were not affected by the scaffolding in 
Experiment 2, but younger children’s scores were affected.  The younger children cross-
classified individuals in the occupation hierarchical category significantly more often in 
Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, suggesting that the scaffolding provided offset some 
of the children’s cognitive load limitations and led to an increase in the cross-
classifications made for these items.  Although the scaffolding children received was in a 
familial domain, on the familial hierarchical items, younger children were only trending 
towards cross-classifying significantly more often in Experiment 2 versus Experiment 1.  
It could be that case that since younger children already had a higher number of cross-
classifications on the familial hierarchical as compared to the occupation hierarchical 
items in Experiment 1, there was less room for them to improve in Experiment 2.  Given 
that there were no differences in older children’s cross-classification rates between 
Experiments 1 and 2 and that responses were significantly higher than chance rates across 
item categories in Experiment 2, it seems that older children’s willingness to cross-
classify individuals was not limited by cognitive load.  However, cross-experiment 
comparisons suggest that younger children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals 
may be increased by providing them with scaffolding that offsets some of the 
representational work they would otherwise have to do from memory. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
In this experiment, we were interested in how reducing cognitive load would 
influence children’s subsequent cross-classification behaviors.  We were also interested 
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in whether cognitive flexibility and nonverbal reasoning abilities predicted children’s 
willingness to classify individuals as holding multiple social roles.  A general limitation 
of this experiment is that since we provided a training aimed at increasing children’s 
cross-classification scores, we may have inadvertently eliminated some of the natural 
variance in these behaviors.  So, although we found no relationship between the cognitive 
competencies we tested and children’s willingness to classify individuals as holding 
multiple social roles, it is possible that this relationship exists when children are not given 
training prior to completing this cross-classification task.  In future studies, it will be 
important to test these cognitive competencies without any sort of training in order to 
gather a baseline for how these underlying mechanisms may relate to children’s more 
naturalistic cross-classification behaviors.  
In our exploration of possible cognitive competencies that may predict children’s 
cross-classification behaviors, we chose to include cognitive flexibility and non-verbal 
reasoning as measures of individual differences.  Although neither of these cognitive 
competencies predicted children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals, there could 
be other mechanisms at play that predict children’s cross-classification behaviors.  In 
future studies, it will be important to examine additional cognitive competencies (e.g., 
theory of mind, inhibitory control, executive function), to better understand what 




EXPERIMENT 3 – CHILDREN’S INFERENCES ABOUT CROSS-CLASSIFIED 
INDIVIDUALS 
Introduction 
Categorization allows people to divide the world into meaningful units and is 
essential to making sense of the environment.  Induction allows people to use category 
information to make educated guesses about new or unfamiliar entities (Markman, 1989; 
Rips, 1975).  Inductive inferences rely on the use of known categories and allow an 
individual to hypothesize beyond the information that is currently available (Gelman, 
1988).  For example, if children know that birds can fly, they may assume that a new, 
unfamiliar bird they encounter would be able to do the same (Gelman & Markman, 
1986).  Children are able to use categories to make inferences (Gelman & Markman, 
1986) and have shown some ability to cross-classify entities (e.g., Nguyen, 2007; 2012; 
Nguyen & Murphy, 2003).  However, when making inferences about items that belong to 
multiple categories, they face the added obstacle of deciding which category they should 
employ to make these inferences.  Category-based induction allows individuals to make 
inferences about unfamiliar situations (Gelman, 1988), including what to expect and how 
to behave in different social situations (Rhodes, 2013).  Induction serves critical functions 
in development, both in guiding social interactions (Nguyen & Chevalier, 2015), and in 
reasoning about others (Shutts et al., 2013).  
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Although adults understand that people and objects belong to many different 
categories, when reasoning about individuals who are members of multiple social 
categories, adults often use only one of the known categories to make inferences about 
that individual.  Studies have suggested that in order to simplify thinking, adults often 
focus on the most ‘distinctive’ social role held by an individual when making inferences 
(e.g., ‘skydiver’ may be more distinctive than ‘tennis player;’ Macrae, Bodenhausen, & 
Milne, 1995; Nelson & Miller, 1995).  Although some studies have shown that adults will 
consider multiple categories when making inferences about cross-classified entities, this 
seems only to be the case when the context of the questions they are being asked refers to 
both categories (Murphy & Ross, 1999).  Indeed, without such context, adults tend to use 
inductive selectivity, and base their inferences off one category, rather than taking all 
category memberships into account.  Inductive selectivity refers to the ability to make 
inferences using individual category memberships of cross-classified entities (Nguyen & 
Girgis, 2014).  
In a study examining children’s induction regarding cross-classified entities, 
Nguyen and Murphy (2003) investigated children’s use of taxonomic, script, and 
evaluative categories when making inferences in a food domain.  In their fourth 
experiment, they explored what categories 4-year-olds, 7-year-olds, and adults used when 
making biochemical (e.g., chemical make-up of food) versus situational (e.g., what 
setting food is eaten in) inferences.  They found that while adults exhibited inductive 
selectivity, using taxonomic and evaluative categories to make biochemical inferences 
and script categories to make situational inferences, children made similar numbers of 
biochemical and situational inferences across all three category types.  In a follow-up 
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experiment examining only taxonomic and script categories, 7-year-old children 
exhibited the adult-like inductive selectivity demonstrated in the previous experiment.  
Although 4-year-olds showed significant differences in their use of taxonomic categories 
to make biochemical inferences and script categories to make situational inferences, they 
did not use taxonomic categories to make biochemical inferences at levels above chance, 
indicating that their use of inductive selectivity is still developing.  Although children as 
young as age four have been found to make some use of inductive selectivity when 
making inferences, this skill is still developing over the early elementary years (Kalish & 
Gelman, 1992; Nguyen, 2012; Nguyen & Murphy, 2003).  
Social categorization may be particularly important for induction, because the 
ability to organize individuals into different social categories, or distinct social groups 
(Diesendruck & Eldror, 2011), allows individuals to make inferences about novel 
situations and to predict outcomes (Rhodes, 2013).  Previous research suggested that 
when reasoning about social categories, children focus on physical and behavioral 
properties (Aboud, 1984; Watson, 1984).  Kalish and Lawson (2008) asked participants 
to make category membership judgments based on either frequency (e.g., how often 
someone does something), psychological (e.g., what someone likes to do), or deontic 
(e.g., what someone must do) information.  They found that younger children (4- to 5-
years-old), older children (7- to 8-years-old), and adults used deontic properties most 
often when making social categorizations in non-personality categories, with younger 
children showing the most reliable use of deontic properties.  However, older children 
also relied on deontic properties to make categorizations in personality categories (or 
those with central psychological properties).  
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In a follow-up experiment, Kalish and Lawson (2008) examined whether 
participants would make inferences about behaviors based on deontic or psychological 
properties, and found that younger children, older children, and adults viewed deontic 
properties as the most reliable information to use when making inferences about 
behavior.  In a third experiment, Kalish and Lawson (2008) investigated whether 
participants believed individuals who had the same deontic properties or preferences 
would be members of the same social categories.  Similar to their first two experiments, 
they found that young children saw deontic properties as more reliable than preferences 
when making inferences about category membership.  However, older children showed 
more mixed responding, inferring category membership similarly from deontic properties 
and preferences.  In contrast to previous claims (Aboud, 1984; Watson; 1984), the results 
from this set of studies suggest that young children make use of deontic properties when 
reasoning about category membership. 
Understanding the social roles that a given person may hold is a necessary 
prerequisite to interacting appropriately with, and accurately anticipating the behavior of, 
others (Rhodes & Gelman, 2008).  However, it may be difficult for children to make 
inferences about individuals who hold multiple social roles (i.e., cross-classified 
individuals), because they need to mentally represent two roles simultaneously.  Further, 
Experiments 1 and 2 of the current set of studies indicated that children may have 
difficulty reasoning about cross-classified individuals when they hold roles that are 
embedded within a hierarchical social role.  Because children rely heavily on 
categorization to understand and respond appropriately to an individual’s roles (Rhodes 
& Brickman, 2010; Kalish & Lawson, 2008), it is important that children are able to 
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accurately use these social categories to make inferences.  The current experiment is 
intended to determine how cross-classification influences children’s inferences.  
Specifically, do children privilege certain social roles when making inferences about the 
deontic properties of a person that holds multiple, sometimes conflicting, social roles?  
Methods 
Participants 
 Participants in this experiment included 35 4- to 5-year-old children (Mage = 4.93, 
SD = .50, females = 17) and 35 7- to 8-year-old children (Mage = 8.06, SD = .54, females 
= 19).  Ninety-one percent of the children in this experiment were Caucasian, 2% were 
Asian, and 3% were mixed race (parents of the remaining 4% did not provide a 
response).  An additional 10 children were interviewed, but their data were excluded 
from analyses due to experimenter error (N = 3), parental interference (N = 2), computer 
malfunction (N = 2), and inability to follow task instructions (N = 1).  Thirty-four of the 
participants from Experiment 3 also participated in Experiment 4. 
Materials 
 The materials for this experiment were made up of two sets of three identical line 
drawings (see Figure 6).  Identical line drawings were used to control for any differences 
that may be assumed based on the appearance of the stimuli.  These line drawings were 
intentionally schematic and lacking detail so that children could not use perceptual 
features irrelevant to the task to guide their responses during testing.  The gender of the 
line drawings was matched to the item type (e.g., female for mom and daughter, male for 
dad and son).  All images were presented on a laptop, using presentation software.   
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Figure 6. Example of stimuli shown to participants in Experiment 3. 
Participants were asked to make inferences for two pairs of social roles, mom vs. 
daughter and dad vs. son, for a total of 6 items (see Appendix C).  For both pairs of social 
roles, each social role was presented singly and cross-classified (e.g., mom, daughter, 
mom-daughter).  Inferences about deontic properties were examined by asking about 
whether people “have to listen” to a given individual.  Trials were blocked so that 
participants always made their inferences about both singly classified individuals in a pair 
before making inferences about the cross-classified individual.  The order of the blocking 
was counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure 
The experimenter and the child sat side-by-side at a table with a laptop in front of 
them.  Participants heard the following directions; “Today I am going to ask you some 
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different questions.  You can tell me, in your own words, what you think the answer is.” 
For the test items, participants were shown an image and given social role information 
about the individual presented on the screen.  While the experimenter gave the participant 
information, she pointed to the image of the person being referenced.  For example, items 
were presented as follows; “This person is a mom (experimenter pointed to line drawing 
on screen).  Do people have to listen to her?”  This procedure was the same for both pairs 
of social roles, except that the pronoun matched the role of the line drawing in the image.  
Participants then responded verbally.  Participant responses were recorded, transcribed, 
and then coded by two independent coders.   
 Results 
Two independent coders coded children’s responses and any disagreement was 
solved by a third independent coder.  Coders agreed on 414/420 responses, κ = .97, 95% 
CI (0.52, 1.42).  Participants’ responses to the question of whether they had to listen to a 
given individual were coded into three primary categories: (a) yes responses, (b) no 
responses, and (c) unsure responses (e.g., ‘I don’t know,’ ‘maybe,’ ‘sometimes;’ see 





Fisher’s exact tests indicated that participants responses on the daughter, 2(2, N 
= 70) = 15.27, p < .05, mom-daughter, 2(2, N = 70) = 5.89, p = .05, son, 2(2, N = 70) = 
19.65, p < .05, and dad-son 2(2, N = 70) = 7.76, p < .05, items were significantly related 
to age group (see Figure 7).  There was no significant relationship between responses and 





Figure 7. Percentage of responses by Age Group and Item Type.
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Discussion 
The goal of this experiment was to examine which social roles children make use 
of when making inferences about deontic properties.  Specifically, we were interested in 
which social roles children would use to make inferences when social roles crossed 
hierarchical boundaries.  Based on children’s reluctance to cross-classify individuals in 
Experiment 1, it seemed likely that the subordinate hierarchical role (e.g., son) would 
undermine the inductive potential of the dominant role (e.g., dad).  Indeed, in the current 
experiment we found that there were different response patterns between age groups for 
the different social roles being probed. 
Children’s responses to the mom and dad items were the most straightforward, 
indicating that across both age groups, the majority of both younger and older children 
believed that people had to listen to these individuals.  However, children’s responses to 
both the subordinate and cross-classified individuals was more varied.  While the 
majority of older children indicated that people did not have to listen to a daughter or son, 
younger children’s responses were almost equally distributed between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
responses.  Interestingly, on the mom-daughter and dad-son items, the majority of 
younger children indicated that people do have to listen to these individuals, while older 
children’s responses were distributed between ‘yes’ and ‘unsure’ responses (see Figure 
9).  
Taken together, these findings suggest a shift in children’s reasoning about the 
deontic properties that hierarchical social roles indicate.  Indeed, when presented with 
cross-classified items (e.g., mom-daughter and dad-son), the majority of younger children 
(80%) indicated that people had to listen to these individuals, suggesting that the 
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subordinate role in the pair (e.g., daughter or son) did not dilute to relevant deontic 
properties of the dominant role in the pair (e.g., mom or dad).  The only items where 
younger children showed mixed patterns of responding were on the subordinate social 
role items (e.g., daughter or son), where about half of the children indicated that people 
had to listen to these individuals (40% and 45.7% respectively) and about half of the 
children indicated that people did not need to listen to these individuals (51.4%).  The 
majority of older children indicated that people did not need to listen individuals who 
only held a subordinate role (82.9%).  When presented with cross-classified items, older 
children also showed a different pattern of responding than the younger children.  On 
both the mom-daughter and dad-son items, 62.9% of the older children indicated that 
people did need to listen to these individuals, and about 30% gave responses indicating 
that they were unsure about whether people needed to listen to these individuals.  In 
contrast, 80% of the younger children indicated that people did need to listen to these 
individuals.  
These results suggest that there is a shift in the way children make inferences 
about cross-classified individuals.  Although more younger children were inclined to 
believe that people had to listen to any individual who held a dominant role (even if they 
also held a subordinate role), they showed more mixed responding to those who held only 
subordinate social roles.  In contrast, older children showed a clear pattern of responding 
when asked about subordinate roles, indicating that people did not have to listen to these 
individuals.  Thus, older children’s mix of yes and unsure responses on the cross-
classified items may indicate that the relative deontic properties of an individual who 
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holds a dominant role can be diluted by simultaneously holding a subordinate role within 
the familial hierarchical domain. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
One limitation of the current experiment is that due to the exploratory nature of 
this experiment, our questions were necessarily broad.  To gather a baseline for how 
children reasoned about the deontic properties of cross-classified individuals, we elected 
to present them with a general question about whether they had to listen to a given 
individual.  It is likely the case that children reason differently about whether people have 
to listen to certain individuals depending on the situation.  It could be the case that 
children show more or less inclination to listen to individuals with certain social roles 
when the nature of what they are listening to is important (e.g., following directions about 
how to play a game versus following directions about how to use household appliances).  
In future studies, it will be important to examine how children’s reasoning differs when 
making inferences in specific contexts. 
Another limitation of the current experiment is that we only included social roles 
within a familial hierarchical domain.  For the purposes of this exploratory experiment, 
we wanted to use social roles that we felt sure the young children in our sample would 
have been familiar with.  Although there were differences in response patterns between 
age groups within familial hierarchical social roles, it would be interesting to see if this 
pattern of responses extended to occupational hierarchical social roles and how children’s 
responses to such items might differ.  Examining how children make inferences about 
individuals holding social roles in different domains would be an informative area of 
future study.  
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CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT 4 – CHILDREN’S REASONING ABOUT THE TESTIMONY OF 
CROSS-CLASSIFIED INDIVIDUALS 
Introduction 
One area in which understanding of social categories may influence children’s 
reasoning is in their trust of informants.  Children’s lack of direct access to information 
(Harris, 2012) results in much of their knowledge being received from others (Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009).  When evaluating information from other sources, children consider 
various factors.  Jaswal and Neely (2006) found that in the absence of any conflicting 
information, both 3- and 4-year-olds preferred object labels provided by an adult over 
those provided by a child, indicating that preschoolers believe adults are better sources of 
information about the names of objects.  Children also make use of informant accuracy 
and reliability when deciding whom to trust (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini, 
Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007).   In the current experiment, we will employ 
methodologies from the selective trust literature to provide converging evidence about 
the development of cross-classification in children and how children reason about the 
testimony of cross-classified individuals.  Specifically, we were interested in whether 
presenting a cross-classified individual within a hierarchical category enhances, dilutes, 
or has no effect on children’s reasoning about that individual’s knowledge status.  
Koenig and Harris (2005) found that when children were presented with 
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individuals who were knowledgeable versus ignorant about the names of various objects, 
both 3- and 4-year-old children were able to distinguish between the two types of 
informants.  Further, 4-year-olds endorsed the claims of knowledgeable informants rather 
than ignorant informants.  In a subsequent study, Koenig and Harris (2005) found that 
both 3- and 4-year-old children extended their preferences for knowledgeable informants 
beyond the domain that that person had previously given accurate information in.  
Similarly, Pasquini and colleagues (2007) also found that 3- and 4-year-old children were 
able to identify inaccurate informants and use that information when deciding who to 
trust, suggesting that children consider the relative accuracy of an informant when 
making decisions about who is a trustworthy source of information.  More generally, 
Lane, Wellman, and Gelman (2013) found that children as young as 3-years-old endorse 
the testimony of informants they believe are smart over those they believe are not smart.  
Similar research has also found that children are sensitive to an informant’s area 
of expertise when evaluating claims (e.g., Danovitch & Keil, 2004; Lane, Wellman, & 
Gelman, 2013; Lutz & Keil, 2002).  Lutz and Keil (2002) presented 3-, 4-, and 5-year-
olds with informants that had differing areas of expertise (e.g., a doctor and a mechanic) 
and asked children which informant they believed would have more information on 
varying topics.  They found that children of all ages were able to correctly attribute 
relevant knowledge to familiar occupations (e.g., a doctor knows more about how to fix 
broken bones than a mechanic), suggesting that they recognize that certain individuals 
have areas of expertise.  Studies have also found that while children may recognize that 
informants have different areas of expertise, it may be difficult for them to use this 
information when evaluating testimony.  Landrum, Mills, and Johnston (2013) examined 
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whether children endorse novel object names based on an informant’s expertise and 
found that both 4- and 5-year-old children used expertise to choose which informant’s 
testimony was accurate.  However, children were generally more accurate at attributing 
knowledge to an individual than using knowledge evaluations when endorsing an 
expert’s claim.  
Given that children take into account relevant information, such as expertise and 
knowledge (e.g., Lutz & Keil, 2002), accuracy (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005), and age 
(Jaswal & Neely, 2006) when choosing who to trust, we were interested in how children 
reason about the testimony of individuals who hold multiple social roles.  Experiment 4 
examines how children reason about the testimony of four pairs of informants: a teacher 
vs. a student, a teacher-student vs. a teacher, a teacher-cook vs. a teacher, and a teacher-
student vs. a teacher-cook.  For each pair of informants, children heard each informant 
name an unknown object inside a box, and then they were asked which informant they 
believe named the object correctly.  Children were also asked which informant in each 
pair was a better teacher as a measure of relative knowledge status. 
There are several different effects that cross-classification might have on 
children’s selective trust.  First, it could be the case that children’s reluctance to classify 
an individual as holding multiple social roles within categories with hierarchical structure 
may lead them to trust cross-classified informants less than singly classified informants.  
In this case, the subordinate role (e.g., student) may dilute the dominant role (e.g., 
teacher).  The items that compare the two cross-classified individuals (teacher-cook vs. 
teacher-student), provide us with a measure of relative dilution.  Since both the 
informants in these items hold multiple social roles, participants responses will indicate 
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which role dilutes the role of teacher more, the one within the same domain (e.g., student) 
or the one within a different domain (e.g., cook).  It seems likely that holding a role 
subordinate to teacher (e.g., student) would undermine the role of teacher more than 
holding an additional unrelated social role (e.g., cook), and thus make the former 
informant’s testimony less trustworthy.  A second outcome is that having any two social 
roles may indicate a wider knowledge base and enhance the role of teacher, thus making 
the cross-classified informant’s testimony more trustworthy.  However, it is also possible 
that this enhancement will only occur when the two social roles are in unrelated domains 
(e.g., teacher-cook).   A third option is that holding two social roles does not enhance or 
dilute the role of teacher either.  Children’s reluctance to cross-classify individuals into 
hierarchical social roles may make it difficult for them to reason about these individuals, 
resulting in random responding. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants in this experiment included 35 4- to 5-year-old children (Mage = 5.03, 
SD = .50, females = 17) and 35 7- to 8-year-old children (Mage = 8.06, SD = .54, females 
= 19) experiment.  Ninety percent of the children in this experiment were Caucasian, 1% 
were African American, and 3% were mixed race (parents of the remaining 6% did not 
provide a response).  An additional 6 children were interviewed, but their data were 
excluded from analyses due to computer malfunction (N = 2), and inability to follow task 
instructions (N = 4).  Thirty-four of the participants from Experiment 4 also participated 
in Experiment 3. 
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Materials 
The materials for this experiment included twelve video clips of women naming a 
hidden object.  Participants were initially shown a still image of an opaque box and told 
that they would be guessing what was inside the box.  In each trial, videos of two women 
were shown side-by-side with the image of an opaque box in between them (see Figure 
8).  Four different pairs of informants appeared in the videos, each appearing in three 
trials.  The four different pairs of informants included a person who was a teacher-student 
vs. a teacher, a teacher-cook vs. a teacher, a teacher-student vs. a teacher-cook, and a 
teacher vs. a student.  Each video depicted two females introducing themselves and then 
looking into a box and providing a novel name for the hidden object inside.  Novel names 
were selected from the Novel Object and Unusual Name Database 2nd Edition (Horst & 
Hout, 2014) to ensure that familiarity with labels did not influence children’s responses.  
The positioning of informants was counterbalanced across participants so that, for each 
pair of informants, both women were shown equally often on either side of the box.  
Social roles were also counterbalanced across participants so that each informant 
introduced themselves as a one informant in the pair for half the participants and the 
other informant in the pair for the other half of the participants to ensure that participants 




Figure 8. Still image of a test trial presented to children in Experiment 4. 
 
Procedure  
The twelve video clips were presented in blocks of three and each block included 
three items probing the same pair of social roles.  For each test item, participants watched 
a video and then answered follow-up questions.  In each video clip, participants watched 
two informants introduce themselves (e.g., “Hi, I’m a teacher and a student”).  For the 
first test item in each block participants were asked to identify which person held which 
social role (e.g., “Can you point to the person who is both a teacher and a student?”).  
66 
These questions were included as a check to make sure that participants remembered 
which informant held which social role(s).  Participants then began the test trials for each 
block.  Each test trial included a video of two informants naming the item inside the box.  
For example, one of the women in the video said, “There’s a flurp in the box,” and the 
other woman said, “There’s a naze in the box.” Participants were then asked to point to 
the person who got it right.  The procedure was the same for all twelve test items, with 
the first item in each block including check questions about which informant held which 
social role.  At the end of each block, participants were asked, “Is one of these people a 
better teacher or are they the same?”  If participants responded that one of the informants 
was a better teacher there was a follow-up question probing whether they believed that 
individual was a little bit better or a lot better.  See Appendix D for example protocol. 
Results 
Testimony Data 
Scores on the testimony trials were calculated as a function of dilution.  For the 
six items that included one cross-classified informant and one singly classified informant 
(e.g., teacher-student vs. teacher; teacher-cook vs. teacher), participants were scored a 1 
for responses based on the informant who held only one social role, and a 0 for responses 
based on the informant who held two social roles.  Higher scores on these items would 
reflect endorsing the testimony of the singly classified teacher and lower scores would 
reflect endorsing the testimony of the teacher-student or teacher-cook.  For the three 
items that included both cross-classified informants (e.g., teacher-student vs. teacher-
cook), participants were scored a 1 for responses based on the informant who held 
unrelated social roles (e.g., teacher-cook), and a 0 for responses based on the informant 
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who held related social roles (e.g., teacher-student).  On these items, higher scores would 
indicate endorsing the testimony of the teacher-cook informant and lower scores would 
indicate endorsing the testimony of the teacher-student informant.  For the three items 
that included only singly classified informants (e.g., teacher vs. student), participants 
were scored a 1 for responses based on the informant who held a dominant role (e.g., 
teacher) and a 0 for responses based on the informant who held a subordinate role (e.g., 
student), so that higher scores would indicate endorsing the teacher’s testimony and 
lower scores would indicate endorsing the student’s testimony.  Each of the four pairs of 
informants yielded a total composite score that could range from 0 to 3.  
High composite scores on these items reflect a tendency for children to trust 
individuals with a single dominant role over individuals with either a subordinate role or 
a cross-classification, and to trust individuals cross-classified with non-hierarchical social 
roles over those holding roles that are hierarchically related.  Thus, high scores on the 
composite generally indicate that cross-classification dilutes trust, especially when the 
two roles are hierarchically related.  Low scores would indicate that cross-classification 
enhances trust, and intermediate scores would indicate that cross-classification does not 






Preliminary analyses revealed no significant main effects of order or gender, so 
subsequent analyses collapsed across these factors.  We used a repeated measures 
ANOVA with Age Group (younger children and older children) as a between-subjects 
factor and Informant Pair (teacher-student vs. teacher, teacher-cook vs. teacher, teacher-
student vs. teacher-cook, teacher vs. student) as a within-subjects factor.  We found no 
significant main effect of Age Group, F(1, 68) = .71, p = .401, p2 = .01, or Informant 
Pair, F(3, 204) = .75, p = .526, p2 =.01, nor a significant interaction between Age Group 










Figure 9. Mean number of responses by Age Group and Informant Pair. 
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Knowledge Attribution Data 
Across all informant pairs, responses indicating that neither informant was a 
better teacher (i.e., they were the same) were scored a 0.  If participants indicated that one 
informant was a better teacher, they were then asked a follow-up question probing 
whether they believed that informant was ‘a little bit better’ or ‘a lot better.’  Responses 
indicating informants holding the roles teacher (as compared to student, teacher-student, 
and teacher-cook) and teacher and cook (as compared to teacher-student) were better 
teachers, received positive scores.  For example, responses indicating that these 
informants were ‘a little bit better’ were scored a 1 and responses indicating that these 
informants were ‘a lot better’ were scored a 2.  Conversely, responses indicating that the 
student, teacher-student, or teacher-cook was a better teacher (as compared to the teacher) 
or that the teacher-student was a better teacher (as compared to the teacher-cook), were 
scored as negative numbers.  So, responses indicating that these informants were ‘a little 
bit better’ were scored a -1 and responses indicating that these informants were ‘a lot 
better’ were scored a -2.  
We conducted planned one-sample t-tests comparing children’s scores for each 
informant pair to chance (chance = 0; see Table 7).  Within the younger age group, 
participants scores were significantly greater than chance on the teacher vs. student trials, 
t(34) = 2.98, p < .01, and the teacher-cook vs. teacher trials, t(34) = 2.68, p < .05, but did 
not differ from chance on the teacher-student vs. teacher trials, t(34) = 0.0, p = 1.00, or 
the teacher-student vs. teacher-cook trials, t(34) = -.18, p = .856 (see Figure 10).  Within 
the younger age group, on the teacher vs. student trials, 6% of children indicated that the 
student was ‘a lot better’ of a teacher, 6% indicated that the student was ‘a little better,’ 
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46% indicated that the teacher and the student were ‘the same,’ 8% indicated that the 
teacher was ‘a little better,’ and 34% indicated that the teacher was ‘a lot better.’  On the 
teacher-student vs. teacher trials, 11% of children indicated that the teacher-student was 
‘a lot better’ of a teacher, 6% indicated that the teacher-student was ‘a little better,’ 66% 
indicated that the teacher-student and the teacher were ‘the same,’ 6% indicated that the 
teacher was ‘a little better,’ and 11% indicated that the teacher was ‘a lot better.’  On the 
teacher-cook vs. teacher trials, 8% of children indicated that the teacher-cook was ‘a lot 
better’ of a teacher, 3% indicated that the teacher-cook was ‘a little better,’ 43% indicated 
that the teacher-cook and the teacher were ‘the same,’ 17% indicated that the teacher was 
‘a little better,’ and 29% indicated that the teacher was ‘a lot better.’  On the teacher-
student vs. teacher-cook trials, 11% of children indicated that the teacher-student was ‘a 
lot better’ of a teacher, 77% indicated that the teacher-student and the teacher-cook were 
‘the same,’ 3% indicated that the teacher-cook was ‘a little better,’ and 9% indicated that 
the teacher-cook was ‘a lot better.’ 
Within the older age group, participants’ scores were significantly greater than 
chance on the teacher vs. student trials, t(34) = 5.25, p < .001, but did not differ from 
chance on the teacher-student vs. teacher trials, t(34) = 1.68, p = .102, teacher-cook vs. 
teacher, t(34) = 1.43, p = .163, or teacher-student vs. teacher-cook trials, t(34) = -.725, p 
= .473.  Within the older age group, on the teacher vs. student trials, 3% of children 
indicated that the student was ‘a little better’ of a teacher, 43% indicated that the teacher 
and the student were ‘the same,’ 26% indicated that the teacher was ‘a little better,’ and 
28% indicated that the teacher was ‘a lot better.’  On the teacher-student vs. teacher trials, 
6% of children indicated that the teacher-student was ‘a lot better’ of a teacher, 11% 
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indicated that the teacher-student was ‘a little better,’ 49% indicated that the teacher-
student and the teacher were ‘the same,’ 14% indicated that the teacher was ‘a little 
better,’ and 20% indicated that the teacher was ‘a lot better.’  On the teacher-cook vs. 
teacher trials, 9% of children indicated that the teacher-cook was ‘a lot better’ of a 
teacher, 3% indicated that the teacher-cook was ‘a little better,’ 60% indicated that the 
teacher-cook and the teacher were ‘the same,’ 11% indicated that the teacher was ‘a little 
better,’ and 17% indicated that the teacher was ‘a lot better.’  On the teacher-student vs. 
teacher-cook trials, 11% of children indicated that the teacher-student was ‘a lot better’ of 
a teacher, 9% indicated that the teacher-student was ‘a little better,’ 66% indicated that 
the teacher-student and the teacher-cook were ‘the same,’ 9% indicated that the teacher-


















Figure 10. Mean knowledge attribution ratings by Age Group and Informant Pair. 
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Discussion 
The goal of this experiment was to examine whether children’s reliance on 
different informants’ testimony differed as a function of the social roles that informants 
held.  Specifically, we were interested in whether children trusted the testimony of a 
cross-classified individual more or less than that of a singly classified individual, and 
how children’s testimony evaluations differed based on the structure of the roles the 
cross-classified individual held.  Many studies have investigated how children evaluate 
testimony, and what factors they consider when choosing whose testimony to trust; 
however, none have directly investigated whether children privilege certain roles when 
evaluating the testimony of individuals who hold multiple social roles.  In their daily 
lives, children encounter individuals with a range of social roles, many of whom hold 
multiple roles within the same domain.  Thus, to gather baseline data on how children 
evaluate the testimony of cross-classified individuals, we used a selective trust paradigm. 
In addition to understanding how children evaluate the testimony of cross-classified 
individuals, we were also interested in children’s judgments of these individuals’ 
knowledge in a given domain. 
The results of the current experiment revealed that overall, children did not seem 
to privilege certain social roles when evaluating informant’s testimony about an unknown 
object.  This pattern of results held for both age groups, indicating that age did not play a 
role in children’s testimony judgments in the current experiment.  However, it seems 
unlikely that children would not trust the testimony of a teacher more than that of a 
student.  Indeed, studies have found that children trust the testimony of informants who 
have expertise in a given area (e.g., Danovitch & Keil, 2004; Lane, Wellman, & Gelman, 
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2013; Lutz & Keil, 2002).  Thus, it may be the case that for novel object naming in 
particular, the social roles individuals hold do not influence children’s reasoning.  
When children’s evaluations of which informant was a better teacher were 
compared to chance, both age group’s scores were significantly greater than chance on 
the teacher vs. student items, indicating that they recognized that a teacher has more 
relevant expertise in a teaching domain than a student.  Additionally, the younger group 
of children had scores that were significantly greater than chance on the teacher-cook vs. 
teacher items, indicating that they believed a singly classified teacher had more expertise 
than a teacher that held multiple roles in different domains (e.g., cook). These results 
suggest that the subordinate role of student did not enhance or dilute the dominant role of 
teacher, and thus did not negatively affect children’s knowledge judgements.  Similar to 
previous findings, it may be the case that while children are able to attribute knowledge 
to an individual, they exhibit more difficulty with using knowledge attributions when 
evaluating testimony (Landrum et al., 2013). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
In the current experiment, we aimed to examine how children reasoned about the 
testimony of cross-classified individuals.  As a first step, we chose to use a novel object 
naming paradigm to see if any differences appeared in the absence of other contextual 
factors.  One limitation of the current experiment may be that this paradigm did not 
reflect children’s real-world interactions.  It could be the case that children do in fact 
evaluate the testimony of cross-classified individuals differently, but only in certain 
situations.  For example, being a teacher and a student may not indicate that you know 
what is inside a box, but being a teacher and a student may indicate that you know more 
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or less about classroom rules.  In future studies, it will be beneficial to see how children 
reason about testimony from cross-classified individuals across a variety of contexts. 
Additionally, in the current experiment we elected to use only occupation 
hierarchical roles.  However, Experiment 1 indicated that both younger and older children 
are less willing to cross-classify individuals as holding multiple social roles in a familial 
hierarchical domain.  Similarly, in Experiment 3, children showed different response 
patterns across age groups in their reasoning about whether or not people had to listen to 
cross-classified individuals within a familial hierarchical domain.  Thus, in future studies 
it will be important to investigate how children reason about the testimony of individuals 
who hold multiple roles in a familial hierarchical domain and how this may differ from 




GENERAL DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 The goal of these four experiments was to examine the development of children’s 
willingness to cross-classify individuals across different social categories, and to 
investigate how children reason about cross-classified individuals.  Cross-classification is 
an important aspect of social cognition as almost everyone a child interacts with holds 
multiple social roles.  Thus, to interact with others both appropriately and effectively, 
children must be able to consider the many social roles that individuals hold.  These 
experiments answered two broad questions: 1) how does children’s willingness to cross-
classify individuals develop?, and 2) how does cross-classification influence children’s 
reasoning in different domains?   
Children’s Cross-classification Behaviors 
In terms of how children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals develops, 
Experiments 1 and 2 illustrated that children become more willing to cross-classify 
individuals over time.  Experiment 1 indicated that there are developmental differences in 
children’s willingness to cross-classify individuals, and that these differences vary based 
on the structure of the social category in question.  Although the younger children in 
Experiment 1 were the least willing to cross-classify individuals across social categories, 
older children were only unwilling to do so when presented with social roles with 
hierarchical structure (e.g., teacher-student, mom-daughter).  Although there was a 
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developmental shift in younger and older children’s willingness to cross-classify 
individuals, older children still did not exhibit adult-like cross-classification across all 
social categories.  The older children in Experiment 1 seemed to represent a 
developmental midpoint between younger children and adults, demonstrating some 
willingness to classify individuals as holding multiple social roles, but only when these 
roles did not have a hierarchical structure.  
Experiment 2 demonstrated that when provided with scaffolding in the form of a 
verbal and visual reminder of hierarchical family structure, younger children showed no 
differences in willingness to cross-classify individuals across hierarchical versus non-
hierarchical social roles.  The older children tested in this experiment showed an 
increased willingness to cross-classify individuals in the familial hierarchical and 
occupation non-hierarchical roles as compared to the occupation hierarchical roles.  
Additionally, both age groups cross-classified at levels significantly above chance for all 
social categories.  Experiment 2 also indicated that children’s cross-classification 
behaviors were not predicted by cognitive flexibility, nonverbal reasoning, or age.  
However, it is also possible that the variables we investigated in Experiment 2 do account 
for some of the differences in children’s cross-classification behaviors, but because the 
scaffolding we provided resulted in younger children cross-classifying at similar rates to 
older children (thus reducing the overall amount of variability in their data), these 
differences were no longer measurable. 
Although studies have found that young children are able to cross-classify entities 
such as objects and food (e.g., Nguyen, 2007; Nguyen & Murphy, 2003), the results of 
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that cross-classification may be more difficult within the 
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social domain.  However, providing young children with scaffolding increased their 
willingness to cross-classify individuals within familial hierarchical social roles.  Thus, it 
may be the case that while reasoning that individuals hold multiple social roles is too 
representationally complex for young children, reducing their cognitive load can address 
this complexity and increase the rate at which they are willing to cross-classify 
individuals.  
However, there could also be more specific cognitive limitations that account for 
children’s difficulties with cross-classification within a social domain.  Children’s 
reluctance to cross-classify individuals may stem from a mutual exclusivity bias 
(Markman, 1989; Merriman & Bowman, 1989; Woodward & Markman, 1991).  
Although this bias may be adaptive for word learning, it may also negatively impact 
children’s ability to perform cross-classification.  However, the literature on the mutual 
exclusivity bias is conflicting, with some studies suggesting that children as young as two 
will accept multiple labels for the same objects (e.g., Clark & Svaib, 1997; Deak & 
Maratsos, 1998; Mervis, Golinkoff, & Bertrand, 1994).  Although studies have indicated 
that children will cross-classify objects, children may be more stringent when cross-
classifying people because the roles people hold determine how children should behave 
or interact with them (Kalish & Lawson, 2008; Rhodes, 2013).  It could be the case that 
children are more conservative about cross-classifying individuals at a young age because 
they believe social categories are more mutually exclusive than non-social categories. 
It is also possible that there are other cognitive mechanisms that underlie 
children’s cross-classification of individuals.  One possibility is that there is a 
relationship between children’s theory of mind and their willingness to cross-classify 
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individuals.  It could be the case that to classify an individual as holding multiple social 
roles, children need to be able to shift their view from one perspective of an individual 
(e.g., teacher) to another perspective (e.g., student).  Another possibility is that there is a 
relation between inhibitory control and children’s beliefs that individuals can be cross-
classified.  It is possible that once children accept a label for an individual (e.g., ‘This 
person is a teacher’), they are unable to inhibit that response when asked to accept a 
second label for the same individual.  Experiment 1 suggests that accepting multiple roles 
may be even more difficult for children when they are reasoning about hierarchically 
structured social roles.  The results of these two experiments suggest that willingness to 
cross-classify individuals is still developing over the preschool and early elementary 
years.  In future studies it will be important to explore these other cognitive competencies 
to discover what variables predict the development of children’s cross-classification 
behaviors in a social domain. 
Finally, in these exploratory experiments, we chose to include eight-year-old 
children because we felt this older age group would allow us to capture changes in 
reasoning between younger children and adults.  Although we discovered clear 
developmental differences between younger participants and adults in Experiment 1, the 
older children in this experiment did not exhibit adult-like reasoning when presented with 
hierarchically structured categories.  In future studies of this nature, it would be 
beneficial to include even older children to determine when adult-like reasoning about 
hierarchically structured social roles occurs.  
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Children’s Reasoning about Cross-classified Individuals 
The second question these experiments answered was how cross-classification 
influences children’s reasoning in different domains.  In these experiments we were 
specifically interested in how children made inferences about and evaluated the testimony 
of cross-classified individuals.  Experiment 3 demonstrated that there are different 
developmental patterns in the children’s inferences about the deontic properties of singly 
versus cross-classified individuals.  Most of the younger and older children indicated that 
they believed people did need to listen to individuals who hold only a dominant social 
role (e.g., a mom or a dad).  Children showed different patterns of responding for 
individuals who held only a subordinate role (e.g., a daughter or a son), with the majority 
of older children indicating that it is not necessary to listen to these individuals, and 
younger children showing a more distributed pattern of responses between needing 
versus not needing to listen to these individuals.  However, the opposite pattern emerged 
for the cross-classified items (e.g., a mom-daughter or a dad-son), in that the majority of 
younger children indicated that you do need to listen to these individuals, while older 
children’s responses were more mixed, sometimes indicating that people did need to 
listen to these individuals and sometimes indicating that they were unsure about whether 
people needed to listen to these individuals.    
These results suggest that younger children may make more use of inductive 
selectivity (i.e., using individual category membership to make inferences about cross-
classified items; Nguyen & Girgis, 2014) than older children when reasoning about cross-
classified individuals, as evidenced by their inclination to believe that people should 
listen to individuals who hold dominant roles (even if they also hold subordinate roles).  
84 
 
In contrast, the distribution of older children’s responses when reasoning about whether 
people needed to listen to cross-classified individuals implies that they were not simply 
using one known social role (e.g., mom or daughter) to make inferences about deontic 
properties but that some children may have tried to account for both social roles (e.g., 
mom and daughter) when making these inferences.  Although research has found that 
adults tend to rely on the most distinctive social role when making inferences about 
multiply classified individuals (Macrae et al., 1995; Nelson & Miller, 1995), children 
may not do so in the early elementary years.  The results of Experiment 3, in addition to 
previous research with adults (Nelson & Miller, 1995; Macrae et al., 1995; Murphy & 
Ross, 1999), suggest that the use of inductive selectivity when making inferences about 
cross-classified individuals may follow a U-shaped developmental curve.  Although 
preschool age children and adults tend to base their inferences off one distinctive social 
role, older children may attempt to make use of both social roles when making inferences 
about cross-classified individuals.  Although studies have found that children as young as 
four demonstrate inductive selectivity when making inferences about objects and food 
(Kalish & Gelman, 1992; Nguyen, 2012; Nguyen & Murphy, 2003), the responses of 
older children in Experiment 3 suggest that their intuitions may still be developing in the 
social domain.  However, it could be that children, like adults (Murphy & Ross, 1999), 
will demonstrate inductive selectivity when making inferences if one social role is made 
contextually salient.  In future studies it will be important to investigate how context 
influences children’s inferences about cross-classified individuals. 
 Experiment 4 indicated that overall children were not privileging certain social 
roles when evaluating cross-classified individuals’ testimony about the name of a hidden 
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object.  However, Experiment 4 did demonstrate that having a subordinate role (e.g., 
student) within the same domain as a dominate role (e.g., teacher) did not enhance or 
dilute the knowledge status (in this case, who was a better teacher) of these individuals.  
Additionally, both younger and older children in this study indicated that they believed a 
singly classified teacher was a better teacher than a singly classified student.  Younger 
children also indicated that they believed a singly classified teacher had greater expertise 
than a cross-classified teacher-cook, suggesting that when a second social role is held in 
an unrelated domain, it may dilute the perceived knowledge of the relevant or dominant 
role.  The overall results of Experiment 4 indicated that children may be better at 
attributing knowledge to an individual than using this information to evaluate their 
testimony (e.g., as in Landrum et al., 2013).  
Given that this experiment was the first step in investigating children’s trust in 
cross-classified informants, we were interested in how testimony was evaluated based 
solely on the social roles that an informant held.  Thus, we elected to employ an object 
naming selective trust paradigm, to remove any contextual factors that children may have 
used to make testimony evaluations.  Although we found that children did not privilege 
certain social roles (e.g., teacher) when evaluating informant’s testimony, it seems 
unlikely that this is the case in children’s real-world behaviors.  Indeed, teachers are often 
a source of knowledge for children.  Additionally, previous research suggests that 
children prefer informants who are accurate and reliable over those that are not (Koenig 
& Harris, 2005; Pasquini et al., 2007).  It could be the case that children do in fact rely on 
a given individual’s social roles when evaluating their testimony, but that doing so 
depends on the context of that testimony.  For example, teachers may know more than 
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students about classroom rules or what to do during a fire drill, but this may not be the 
case for knowing the name of an object.  In future studies it will be important to examine 
how children make use of social roles when evaluating testimony in different contexts. 
Conclusions 
Overall, the findings of these four experiments illustrate that there are 
developmental differences in willingness to cross-classify individuals and reasoning 
about cross-classified individuals, between the preschool, early elementary, and adult 
years.  Social roles provide information about the traits and behaviors of others (Baron et 
al., 2014), what people may be obligated or not allowed to do (Kalish & Lawson, 2008), 
and how others should behave in relation to certain individuals (Watson, 1984).  The 
results of these experiments suggest that cross-classification may influence the way 
children make inferences about individuals, but that cross-classification does not 
influence testimony evaluations when social roles are not contextually salient.  Although 
these experiments indicate that children are reluctant to cross-classify individuals within 
hierarchical domains, they also highlight the importance of examining the influence this 
reluctance may have in more real-world scenarios.  Because social roles represent such a 
great deal of information relevant to social interactions, it could be the case that it takes 
more time and experience for children to develop adult-like cross-classification and 
reasoning in the social domain than it does in non-social domains.  Future research 
should continue to explore the development of children’s cross-classification behaviors in 
a social domain, as well as investigate how children’s intuitions about cross-classification 
influences their interactions with and reasoning about others.   
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Today I’m going to show you pictures of people and tell you different things about them. 
I want you to listen very carefully because I am going to ask you questions about these 
people, okay? 
12.This person is nice. Can this person also be mean?
Yes No 
15.This person is a runner. Can this person also be a cook?
Yes No 
14.This person is a student. Can this person also be a teacher?
Yes No 
9.This person is a son. Can this person also be a dad?
Yes No 
19.This is a person. Can this person also be a kangaroo?
Yes No 
5.This person is strong. Can this person also be weak?
Yes No 
10.This person is a swimmer. Can this person also be an artist?
Yes No 
16.This person is a dad. Can this person also be a son?
Yes No 
18.This person is poor. Can this person also be rich?
Yes No 
24.This person is mean. Can this person also be nice?
Yes No 
8.This person is a patient. Can this person also be a doctor?
Yes No 
1.This is a person. Can this person also be a giraffe?
Yes No 
4.This person is a mom. Can this person also be a daughter?
Yes No 
3.This person is a cook. Can this person also be a runner?
Yes No 
7.This is a person. Can this person also be a dolphin?
Yes No 
11.This person is short. Can this person also be tall?
Yes No 
21.This person is a daughter. Can this person also be a mom?
Yes No 
6.This person is rich. Can this person also be poor?
Yes No 
2.This person is a teacher. Can this person also be a student?
Yes No 
17.This person is weak. Can this person also be strong?
Yes No 
13.This is a person. Can this person also be a horse?
Yes No 
20.This person is a doctor. Can this person also be a patient?
Yes No 
22.This person is an artist. Can this person also be a swimmer?
Yes No 




(Family tree schematic on table) First I want to tell you about this picture. (Put circle on 
daughter/son) This person is her/his daughter/son (point to mom/dad). (Put circle on 
mom/dad) This person is her/his (point to daughter/son) mom/dad. She/he (keep circle on 
mom/dad) is also this persons (point to grandma/grandpa) daughter/son. (Put circle on 
grandma/grandpa) This person is her/his (point to mom/dad) mom/dad. 
Now I’m going to show you pictures of people and tell you different things about them. I 
want you to listen very carefully because I am going to ask you questions about these 
people, okay? 
1.This person is a runner. Can this person also be a cook?
Yes No 
5.This person is a dad. Can this person also be a son?
Yes No 
7.This person is a mom. Can this person also be a daughter?
Yes No 
2.This person is a student. Can this person also be a teacher?
Yes No 
9.This person is a daughter. Can this person also be a mom?
Yes No 
6.This person is a patient. Can this person also be a doctor?
Yes No 
4.This person is a swimmer. Can this person also be an artist?
Yes No 
3.This person is a son. Can this person also be a dad?
Yes No 
10.This person is a teacher. Can this person also be a student?
Yes No 
8.This person is a cook. Can this person also be a runner?
Yes No 
11.This person is a doctor. Can this person also be a patient?
Yes No 
12.This person is an artist. Can this person also be a swimmer?
Yes No 
TOTAL: . /12 
Now I need your help matching some words with pictures. 
Student. Can you point to the picture of a student? 
Teacher Student Doctor Patient Chef 
Doctor. Can you point to the picture of a doctor? 
Teacher Student Doctor Patient Chef 
Patient. Can you point to the picture of a patient? 
Teacher Student Doctor Patient Chef 
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Teacher. Can you point to the picture of a teacher? 
Teacher Student Doctor Patient Chef 
Card Sort Task 
Place the two sorting trays side by side in front of the subject within reaching 
distance (i.e., blue rabbit in the tray to the child’s left and red boat in the tray to the 
child’s right). 
1. Demonstration Phase
SAY, “Here’s a blue rabbit and here’s a red boat. Now, we’re going to play a card 
game. This is the color game. In the color game, all the blue ones go here [pointing to 
the tray on the left], and all the red ones go there [pointing to the tray on the right].” 
Take first Demo Card and SAY, “See, here’s a blue one. So it goes here [place it face 
down in the correct tray].”  
REPEAT, “If it’s blue it goes here, but if it’s red it goes there.” Show children the 
other Demo Card and SAY, “Now here’s a red one. Where does this one go?”  
**If the child takes the card and sorts it correctly or simply indicates the 
correct tray by pointing, say, “Very good. You know how to play the color game.” 
If they point, say, “Can you help me put this red one down?” Ensure that the 
card is placed face-down in the appropriate tray, turning the card over if 
necessary.  
**If the child sorts incorrectly, say, “No, this one’s red, so it has to go over here 
in the color game. Can you help me put this red one down?” Ensure that the card 
is placed face-down in the appropriate tray. 
2. Pre-Switch Phase
Proceed immediately to the pre-switch phase.  On the first pre-switch trial, SAY, 
“Now it’s your turn. So remember, if it’s blue it goes here, but if it’s red it goes there.” 
Select the first test card, the blue boat with #1 labeled on the back.  SAY, “This one 
is (*color of card), where does it go?” The child may take the card and place it in a 
tray or simply point to one of the trays, in which case, you may sort the card for 
them. Always ensure that the card is placed face down in the appropriate tray. 
Whether or not children sort correctly, SAY, “Let’s do another one, this card is 




3. Post-Switch Phase 
After six pre-switch trials, SAY, “Now we’re going to play a new game. We’re not 
going to play the color game anymore. We’re going to play the shape game. In the shape 
game, all the rabbits go here [pointing to the tray on the left], and all the boats go there 
[pointing to the tray on the right]. Remember, if it’s a rabbit, put it here, but if it’s a 
boat put it there. Okay?”  
Do not remove the target cards or the cards that were sorted during the pre-switch 
phase, and do not pause between pre- and postswitch phases.  
 
Select the seventh test card, the red rabbit with #7 labeled on the back. Say, “Where 
does it go?” Whether or not the child sorts correctly, SAY, “Let’s do another one, 
where does this one go?” 
 
 
Pre/Post Combined Total Correct: ___________ 
Pre-Switch/Color Trial  
Item Card Answer Correct=1; 
Incorrect=0 
1 Blue Boat Blue (Tray 1)  
2 Red Rabbit Red (Tray 2)  
3 Red Rabbit Red (Tray 2)  
4 Blue Boat Blue (Tray 1)  
5 Red Rabbit Red (Tray 2)  
6 Blue Boat Blue (Tray 1)  
Post-Switch/Shape Trial  
Item Card Answer Correct=1; Incorrect=0 
7 Red Rabbit Rabbit (Tray 1)  
8 Blue Boat Boat (Tray 2)  
9 Red Rabbit Rabbit (Tray 1)  
10 Red Rabbit Rabbit (Tray 1)  
11 Blue Boat Boat (Tray 2)  
12 Blue Boat Boat (Tray 2)  
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** Children must get at least 5 correct on Post-Switch Trial to proceed to Border 
Version 
4. Border Phase
If the child gets at least 5 out of the 6 post-switch trials correct they can move on to 
the border phase. However, if the child gets less than 5 correct on the post-switch 
trial they are done with the Card Sort Task and do not qualify for the border trial. 
If the child qualifies for the border trials, say, “Okay, you played really well. Now I 
have a more difficult game for you to play. In this game, you sometimes get cards that 
have a black border around it like this one [showing a red rabbit with a border]. If you 
see cards with a black border, you have to play the color game. In the color game, red 
ones go here and blue ones go there [pointing to the appropriate trays].  
Take a red rabbit with a border demo card and say, “This card’s red, so I’m going to 
put it right there [placing it face down in the appropriate tray]. But if the cards have 
no black border, like this one [show them the red rabbit without a border demo card], 
you have to play the shape game. In the shape game, if it’s a rabbit, we put it here, but if 
it’s a boat, we put it there [pointing to the appropriate trays].This one’s a rabbit, so 
I’m going to put it right here [placing it face down in the appropriate tray]. Okay? 
Now it’s your turn.” 
Say “Remember, if there is a black border then you play the color game. If there is no 
black border then you play the shape game.” Select the first border trial card, blue 
boat with a border that is labeled #13 on the back.  “This one has (or doesn’t have) a 
border. Where does it go?” 
For remaining cards, say, “This one has (or doesn’t have) a border. Where does it go?” 
Border Trial 
Item Card Answer Correct=1; Incorrect=0 
13 Blue Boat w/ Border Blue (Tray 1) 
14 Red Rabbit Rabbit (Tray 1) 
15 Red Rabbit w/ Border Red (Tray 2) 
16 Blue Boat Boat (Tray 2) 
17 Red Rabbit Rabbit (Tray 1) 
18 Blue Boat w/ Border Blue (Tray 1) 
19 Red Rabbit w/ Border Red (Tray 2) 
20 Blue Boat Boat (Tray 2) 
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Border Version Total Correct: ___________ 
GRAND TOTAL CORRECT: __________ 
(Note:  Add total correct from Color, Shape, and Border trials) 
21 Blue Boat w/ Border Blue (Tray 1) 
22 Red Rabbit Rabbit (Tray 1) 
23 Blue Boat Boat (Tray 2) 
24 Red Rabbit w/ Border Red (Tray 2) 
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Appendix C 
Today I am going to ask you some different questions. You can tell me in your own 
words what you think the answer is. 
































(Start on slide 1 with image of only the box) Today I need your help answering some 
questions. I want to find out what is in this box (point to box on screen), so I asked some 
people I know. They made videos to tell me what they think is in the box. It is your job to 
tell me who got it right. 
TeacherStudent vs. TeacherCook 
TSvsTC1. [Slide 2, play video] 
TSvsTC1check1. Can you point to which person is both a Teacher and a Cook? (If 
child answers incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and 
saying, “Actually this person is both a teacher and a cook” and repeat the original 
question) 
TeacherCook TeacherStudent # of times repeated for 
accurate answer 
TSvsTC1check2. Can you point to which person is both a Teacher and a Student? 
(If child answers incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and 
saying, “Actually this person is both a teacher and a student” and repeat the 
original question) 
TeacherCook TeacherStudent # of times repeated for 
accurate answer 
TSvsTC3. [Slide 2] Remember the person who is a Teacher and a Cook (point to 
TeacherCook) said there is a ‘vab’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher and a 
Student (point to TeacherStudent) said there is a ‘dax’ in the box. Can you point to the 
person who got it right? 
TeacherCook TeacherStudent 
TSvsTC2. [Slide 3, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher and a Student 
(point to TeacherStudent) said there is a ‘stid’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher 
and Cook (point to TeacherCook) said there is a ‘gaz’ in the box. Can you point to the 
person who got it right? 
TeacherStudent TeacherCook 
TSvsTC1. [Slide 4, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher and a Cook (point 
to TeacherCook) said there is a ‘kiv’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher and a 
Student (point to TeacherStudent) said there is a ‘hux’ in the box. Can you point to the 
person who got it right? 
TeacherCook TeacherStudent 
TSvsTCcomparison. [Stay on Slide 4 screen] Is one of these people a better teacher or are 
they the same? (if they say one of them is better, circle answer and move on to follow-up) 
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  TeacherCook   Same  TeacherStudent 
 
 TSvsTCfollow-up. Are they a little bit better or a lot better? 
  Little bit better A lot better 
TeacherCook vs. Teacher 
 
TCvsT1. [Slide 5, play video]  
TCvsT1check1. Can you point to which person is only a Teacher? (If child 
answers incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and saying, 
“Actually this person is only a teacher” and repeat the original question) 
  Teacher  TeacherCook  # of times repeated for  
         accurate answer         
TCvsT1check2. Can you point to which person is both a Teacher and a Cook? (If 
child answers incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and 
saying, “Actually this person is both a teacher and a cook” and repeat the original 
question) 
  Teacher  TeacherCook  # of times repeated for  
         accurate answer         
TCvsT3. [Slide 5] Remember the person who is a Teacher (point to Teacher) said there is 
a ‘kark’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher and a Cook (point to TeacherCook) 
said there is a ‘lep’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it right? 
  Teacher  TeacherCook  
TCvsT2. [Slide 6, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher and a Cook (point 
to TeacherCook) said there is a ‘lorp’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher (point 
to Teacher) said there is a ‘wost’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it right? 
  TeacherCook  Teacher 
TCvsT1. [Slide 7, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher (point to Teacher) 
said there is a ‘zog’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher and a Cook (point to 
TeacherCook) said there is a ‘goeb’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it 
right? 
  Teacher  TeacherCook 
TCvsTcomparison. [Stay on Slide 7 screen] Is one of these people a better teacher or are 
they the same? (if they say one of them is better, circle answer and move on to follow-up) 
  Teacher  Same  TeacherCook 
 
 TCvsTfollow-up. Are they a little bit better or a lot better? 
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Little bit better A lot better 
TeacherStudent vs. Teacher 
TSvsT1. [Slide 8, play video] 
TSvsT1check1. Can you point to which person is both a Teacher and a Student? (If 
child answers incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and 
saying, “Actually this person is both a teacher and a student” and repeat the 
original question) 
TeacherStudent Teacher # of times repeated for 
accurate answer 
TSvsT1check2. Can you point to which person is only a Teacher? (If child 
answers incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and saying, 
“Actually this person is only a teacher” and repeat the original question) 
TeacherStudent Teacher # of times repeated for 
accurate answer 
TSvsT3. [Slide 8] Remember the person who is a Teacher and a Student (point to 
TeacherStudent) said there is a ‘zorb’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher (point 
to Teacher) said there is a ‘husp’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it right? 
TeacherStudent Teacher 
TSvsT2. [Slide 9, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher (point to Teacher) 
said there is a ‘naze’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher and a Student (point to 
TeacherStudent) said there is a ‘flurp’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it 
right? 
Teacher TeacherStudent 
TSvsT1. [Slide 10, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher and a Student 
(point to TeacherStudent) said there is a ‘roak’ in the box and the person who is a 
Teacher (point to Teacher) said there is a ‘jate’ in the box. Can you point to the person 
who got it right? 
TeacherStudent Teacher 
TSvsTcomparison. [Stay on Slide 10 screen] Is one of these people a better teacher or are 
they the same? (if they say one of them is better, circle answer and move on to follow-up) 
TeacherStudent  Same Teacher 
TSvsTfollow-up. Are they a little bit better or a lot better? 
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Little bit better A lot better 
Teacher vs. Student 
TvsS1. [Slide 11, play videos] 
TvsS1check1. Can you point to which person is a Teacher? (If child answers 
incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and saying, “Actually 
this person is a Teacher” and repeat the original question) 
Teacher Student # of times repeated for 
accurate answer 
TvsS1check2. Can you point to which person is a Student? (If child answers 
incorrectly, correct them by pointing to accurate person and saying, “Actually 
this person is a Student” and repeat the original question) 
Teacher Student # of times repeated for 
accurate answer 
TvsS3. [Slide 11] Remember the person who is a Teacher (point to Teacher) said there is 
a ‘rel’ in the box and the person who is a Student (point to Student) said there is a ‘tust’ in 
the box. Can you point to the person who got it right? 
Teacher Student 
TvsS2. [Slide 12, play video] Remember the person who is a Student (point to Student) 
said there is a ‘wilp’ in the box and the person who is a Teacher (point to Teacher) said 
there is a ‘deld’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it right? 
Student Teacher 
TvsS1. [Slide 13, play video] Remember the person who is a Teacher (point to Teacher) 
said there is a ‘cheem’ in the box and the person who is a Student (point to Student) said 
there is a ‘sarl’ in the box. Can you point to the person who got it right? 
Teacher Student 
TvsScomparison. [Stay on Slide 13 screen] Is one of these people a better teacher or are 
they the same? (if they say one of them is better, circle answer and move on to follow-up) 
Teacher  Same Student 
TvsSfollow-up. Are they a little bit better or a lot better? 
Little bit better A lot better 
We’re all done, thanks for helping me today!
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